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look at the policies 
of the International 
Monetary Fund* 
Richard Lynn Ground** 
Since its inception, the International Monetary Fund 
has been harshly criticized for the policy measures it 
has recommended. In most cases, this criticism has 
taken the form of an outright rejection of IMF policies, 
mainly because of the high economic, social and politi-
cal costs they entail, 
This article also takes a critical look at the IMF 
position; however, this criticism is based on a detailed 
study of the main elements of that position. On the one 
hand, the author analyses the orthodox adjustment 
paradigm, as well as recent suggestions for including 
in it consideration of certain structural factors, and, on 
the other, he discusses the recessionary bias that is 
inherent in that paradigm. This bias is evident both in 
the meagre and belated Financial support given the 
Latin American countries by the IMF during the cur-
rent crisis, and in the domestic policies provided for in 
the adjustment programmes it recommends. 
The author's review of these domestic policies, 
which makes up the nucleus of the article is based on a 
study of the 17 IMF agreements that were in force in 
Latin America and the Caribbean at the end of 1983. 
The author lists and analyses the performance criteria, 
preconditions and policy understandings employed by 
the IMF; identifies and compares the policy mix con-
tained in the agreements; discusses operational, in-
termediate and ultimate targets provided for in the 
agreements; and, finally, evaluates the Fund's use of 
fixed specific targets for its performance criteria. On 
the basis of this analysis, the author notes the main 
sources of recessive bias in IMF policies and suggests 
how they might be reformed. 
"This article was originally written in Spanish. 
**Mr. Ground is on the staff of the Economic Develop-
ment Division, KCLAC:. 
I 
Introduction* 
A. PURPOSE AND JUSTIFICATION 
OF THIS STUDY 
In the absence of a new development style based 
on profound domestic reforms including, above 
all, domestic financing of capital formation,1 
there may be no clear alternative to the orthodox 
adjustment model. This does not mean, howev-
er, that the orthodox model is faultless, for it 
does in fact have a series of shortcomings that in 
practice cause unnecessary harm to the economy 
and to the welfare of the population. 
One of the main purposes of this study is, in 
fact, to show why the adjustment model applied 
by the International Monetary Fund should be 
reformed and how this might be accomplished. 
The other is to provide a more detailed and sys-
tematic description of the nature and character-
istics of the adjustment programmes being spon-
sored by the Fund. 
There are two important justifications for 
this study. In the first place, towards the end of 
1983, seventeen Latin American and Caribbean 
countries had entered into adjustment agree-
ments with the International Monetary Fund. In 
the second place, there has always been and still 
T h e author is grateful to Guillermo Mundt for his 
efficient assistance in the preparation of statistical tables. The 
author also wishes to thank Andrés Blanchi, Adolfo Gurrieri, 
Aníbal Pinto and Enrique de la Piedra for their useful com-
ments on preliminary drafts of this paper, the final Spanish 
version of which was completed in March 1984. The author 
alone is responsible for any remaining errors or deficiencies. 
'We expect'to discuss this subject on another occasion. 
Several proposals have been made for dealing with and over-
coming the current crisis. See, for example, Enrique V. Igle-
sias and Carlos Alzamora Traverso, "Bases for a Latin Amer-
ican response to the international economic crisis", CBPAL 
Review, No. 20 (August 1983); "América Latina ante la rece-
sión", Pensamiento Iberoamericano, No. 4 (July-December 
1983); and CEPAL, "Adjustment policies and renegotiation of 
the external debt" (E/CEPAL/SES.207G.17), Santiago, Chile, 
February 1984. See also Raúl Prebisch, Capitalismo periférico: 
crisisy transformación (Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1981), Part Six. 
46 
remains a surprising degree of misunderstand-
ing about the specific content of the Fund's ad-
justment programmes. In this regard, a compar-
ative study of the characteristics of those pro-
grammes may be of particular interest. 
We believe that this study, which makes ex-
tensive use of several new theoretical and empir-
ical analyses of recent monetarist experiments in 
the centre, shows that the Fund's approach has 
formal and practical déficiences which are ex-
tremely important, not only from the academic 
poini of view, but also in light of the fact that the 
fate of several hundred million people, including 
80% of the population of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, is linked to a greater or lesser degree, 
to the results of IMF adjustment programmes. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of the content of those 
programmes shows that some of the criticisms 
traditionally directed against the Fund do not 
seem to be justified. 
T h e most important result of this study, 
however, may be the finding that the reforms of 
IMF policies that are proposed would almost all be 
quite easy to implement and would in no way 
make it necessary to abandon the basic principles 
governing the Fund's operation or the paradigm 
it advocates. On the other hand, I am certain that 
these reforms could bring about a notable im-
provement in the performance of those econo-
mies that are obliged by circumstances to resort 
to the Fund. 
This article is divided into three parts. In the 
remainder of the first part, the nature and 
macroeconomic meaning ofthe adjustment pro-
cess are discussed and a brief description of the 
orthodox adjustment paradigm is given. In the 
second part, and nucleus ofthe article, the reces-
sive bias of the Fund's approach is brought out. 
In the first place, the performance ofthe Fund as 
a source and catalyst of external financing is 
evaluated. A review is then made ofthe domestic 
economic policies provided for in the Fund's ad-
justment programmes. This includes a study of 
both the approach on which they are based and 
their actual implementation in the 17 adjustment 
agreements that were in force in Latin America 
and the Caribbean at the end of 1983. Finally, the 
Fund's conditionality and its other domestic ad-
justment policies are critiqued and some policy 
reforms are proposed. The third part of the arti-
cle consists of the summary and conclusions. 
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B , T H E N A T U R E A N D M A C R O -
E C O N O M I C MEANING OF 
THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 
It should be noted from the outset that once the 
need to adjust arises, it is implacable, for it is 
rooted in a budgetary restriction, i.e., the impos-
sibility of absorbing (spending) more resources 
than are available, counting both the country's 
own resources and those it may borrow. A pro-
cess of adjustment is inevitable whenever the gap 
between expenditure and income rises above a 
sustainable magnitude. It involves the reduction 
of the difference between gross domestic invest-
ment and gross national savings —or, what 
amounts to the same thing, the reduction of the 
deficit on the balance-of-payments current 
account— to an amount that is compatible with 
the expected —an eventually, the actual— flow 
of external financing. In this context, the central 
issue is how to minimize the cost of adjustment. 
Although the rationale of the adjustment pro-
cess does not, therefore, have anything to do with 
the causes of disequilibria or with such policies as 
may be adopted —or not adopted— to deal with 
them, a question concerning the relevance of the 
duration of the source or sources of maladjust-
ment of external accounts to the design of adjust-
ment policies does arise. 
In any case if a disequilibrium cannot be 
financed, there must be, and in fact will be, an 
adjustment. Likewise, regardless of what the ori-
gin —domestic, external or both— of the mal-
adjustment may be, a disequilibrium between ex-
penditure and income cannot persist without ex-
ternal financing. On the other hand, the ques-
tions ofthe duration and origins of unsustainable 
disequilibria are pertinent to the design of inter-
national adjustment policies; in other words, 
they are relevant to the determination of the 
optimum combination of external financing and 
internal adjustment. Everyone agrees in princi-
ple on this crucial matter, i.e., that for the sake of 
efficiency, a disequilibrium which can be attrib-
uted to temporary external factors should be 
financed. However, whether the international 
financial community is prepared to provide the 
resources necessary to avoid the imposition of an 
inefficient adjustment is another matter. In prac-
tice, the criterion that has been used to determine 
how strict an adjustment is to be imposed on 
deficit countries has not been the ideal one. 
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C. A N OVERVIEW O F T H E O R T H O D O X 
ADJUSTMENT PARADIGM2 
Although it has undergone some changes over 
time, the orthodox approach to the causes and 
the process of adjustment still assigns a central 
role to money; in other words, it is still essentially 
monetarist. According to this approach, whenev-
er there is inflation or an unsustainable bal-
ance-of-payments deficit, there will invariably 
have been an excessive supply of money in rela-
tion to the demand for real monetary balances. 
This is not to say that other causal factors are 
ignored. On the contrary, in some cases the 
source of the excessive growth of money —usual-
ly the public sector deficit— is believed to play a 
fundamental role. In principle, however, it is 
held that no non-monetary factor can in and of 
itself generate inflation or external disequilibria 
independently of the behaviour of monetary 
variables; a possibility that the real exchange 
rate may fall below the level of equilibrium 
—thus giving rise to a deficit on current accounts 
a l though not necessarily on the global bal-
ance-of-payments position— is admitted but this 
is also believed to be the result of an excessive 
creation of money. 
In this paradigm, three types of policies are 
envisaged for orienting the adjustment process; 
these policies are aimed at restricting the growth 
of the means of payment, limiting deficit spend-
ing by the public sector, and modifying relative 
prices, especially the real exchange rate. Restrict-
ing monetary growth and cutting the public-
sector deficit help decelerate inflation and re-
store a sustainable relationship between domes-
tic expenditure and income, thanks to their de-
pressive effects on domestic demand. The idea is 
to achieve this not only by reducing imports, but 
also by increasing exports, since the restriction of 
domestic demand would free, goods and services 
for the external market and reduce the prof-
itability of domestic sales. At the same time, 
monetary restriction increases the amount of 
the external deficit that can be financed to the 
extent that an increase in domestic interest rates 
s trengthens the balance-of-payments capital 
2 The IMF short-term adjustment paradigm is discussed 
in greater detail in section it. 
account. Reducing the public-sector deficit, for 
its part, also serves another purpose, i.e., to pre-
vent the public sector from monopolizing bank 
credit to the detriment of private investment 
during times of monetary restriction. The mod-
ification of relative prices which results from rais-
ing the real exchange rate —which in principle, 
can be achieved by reducing domestic inflation 
with respect to external inflation (or reducing the 
level of domestic prices as compared with exter-
nal prices) or modifying the nominal exchange 
rate— helps curtail both external and internal 
disequilibria by diverting domestic expenditure 
from imports and exportable goods and services 
and encouraging the reallocation of factors of 
production to the sectors producing tradeable 
goods and services. At the same time, modifica-
tion of the exchange rate can complement the 
depressive effect of restrictive monetary and fis-
cal policies on the level of domestic expenditure 
and of the potential expansionary effect of mon-
etary restriction on the net inflow of capital, pro-
vided it creates an excess demand in the market 
for financial assets. 
In addi t ion, exchange adjustments are 
usually accompanied by policies that affect other 
relative prices, such as real salaries and wages 
and the real interest rate, reinforcing the impact 
of an increase in the nominal exchange rate on 
the real one. 
The orthodox school is opposed to the intro-
duction of measures, such as tariffs and controls, 
which affect capital flows and prices and restrict 
the scope of the market, in the adjustment policy, 
both because it is felt that such measures do not 
get to the root of the problem —thus only tem-
porarily suppressing its manifestations—and be-
cause it is felt that they might be detrimental to 
domestic welfare. It is also argued that measures 
which restrict free trade undermine the basis of 
international prosperity. 
So much for our description of the tradition-
al model and policies. More recently, with the 
serious deterioration of the international econ-
omy, the accumulation of very large disequi-
libria and the emergence of many that were ad-
justment processes much more drastic than had 
been the case between the early 1950s and the 
1970s, when the adjustment and paradigm poli-
cies were devised, concern has focused much 
more explicitly on the real side of the economy 
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during the adjustment process and on the effect 
of that process on the growth of productive 
capacity. 
Although this concern has not been system-
atically reflected in the formal structure of the 
orthodox paradigm, it has been evident in cer-
tain policy initiatives aimed at dealing with those 
cases in which the disequilibria of the external 
sector are very great or appear to have a struc-
tural origin, or both. In brief, in the contem-
porary or long-term orthodox approach, it is 
proposed that traditional short-term strategies 
for m a n a g i n g domes t i c d e m a n d be com-
plemented with policies that have a more direct 
and extensive influence on the supply side, in 
order to eliminate structural maladjustments 
without excessively (unjustifiably) depressing the 
level of activity and the development of produc-
tion capacity. 
As regards, the content of the Fund's pro-
grammes, the aforementioned concern led to the 
creation of a new facility in which the duration of 
adjustment programmes was extended to three 
years, the amount of available financing was in-
creased and loan maturities were extended up to 
10 years. At the same time, greater importance 
was attached to measures affecting variables such 
as the structure of production and of employ-
ment and the composition of expenditure and 
balance-of-payments accounts, whereas in the 
past, when priority had almost always been 
attached to shor-term measures, these variables 
had been considered exogenous or unimportant. 
Greater importance was also attached to the 
microeconomic aspects of disequilibria and 
3See, for example, Andrew D. Crockett, "Stabilization 
policies in developing countries: some policy considerations", 
IMÏ Staff Papers, Vol. 28 (March 1981); Bela Belassa, "Struc-
tural adjustment policies ¡n developing economies", World 
Development, Vol. 10, No. 1 (October 1982), and Ernest Stern, 
"World Bank financing of structural adjustment", John Wil-
liamson, éd., in IMF conditionality (Washington, D.C., Institute 
for International Economics, 1983). See also Tony Kiltick and 
Mary Sutton, "Disequilibria, financing and adjustment in 
developing countries", in Tony Killick, éd., Adjustment and 
financing in the developing world. The role of the International 
Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C., International Monetary 
Fund, in association with the Overseas Development institute 
of London, 1982); and Moshin Khan and Roberto Zahler, 
"Efectos macroeconómicos de cambios en las barreras del 
comercio al movimiento de capitales", Cuadernos de la CEPAL, 
No. 20 (December 1982). 
hence to the use of measures which directly —or 
more directly— affect efficiency in the allocation 
and utilization of resources. 
The World Bank, for its part, has responded 
by creating its so-called "structural adjustment 
loan". This facility allows longer terms —from 
five to seven years— for achieving the targets 
established; greater attention is given to policies 
relating to supply, and conditionality is linked 
solely to the adoption of specific measures. The 
total volume of financing available is similar to 
that provided under the Fund's new facility. 
In their approach to structural problems and 
strengthening of the supply side, both the Fund 
and the World Bank follow the well-known neo-
classical interpretation of underdevelopment, 
i.e., that when inadequate or mistaken domestic 
economic policies become chronic, they deform 
the structures of the economy, undermine its 
capacity and, in extreme cases, render it inca-
pable of responding effectively to the changing 
situation —either favourable or unfavourable— 
of the international economy. 
Within this frame of reference, the response 
to the major disequilibria existing at present 
—even if they have been caused mainly by exter-
nal factors— must be the implementation of re-
forms —hopeful ly far - reaching ones— in 
domestic policies and institutions which restrict 
the scope and hinder the functioning of the mar-
ket and private initiative. In brief, these reforms 
include, as the case may be, the liberalization of 
capital market transactions, including the open-
ing-up of the balance-of-payments capital 
account; the liberation of the domestic price sys-
tem from controls, including the opening-up 
—hopefully on a broad and uniform basis— of 
the balance-of-payments current account; and 
the restructuring and reduction of the size of the 
public sector, including the implementation of 
criteria of financial efficiency. Reforms in the 
labour market and social security, or special 
promotional policies, particularly for the devel-
opment of the energy sector, may also be in-
cluded. The interest —previously almost non-
existent— in disaggregated values is also worth 
mentioning. For example, an effort is made not 
only to restore financial equilibrium, but also to 
decide which items of income and expenditure 
are to be increased or decreased, in order to 
reconcile financial equilibrium with structural 
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adjustment. Finally, one discerns a greater con-
cern for manipulating the exchange rate in order 
to keep it at a realistic level. 
These then would be the policies proposed 
under the orthodox approach for dealing with 
structural disequilibria. Although some of them, 
such as those pertaining to the increased dis-
aggregation of financial variables, appear to 
have been included in all short- and long-term ad-
justment programmes sponsored by the Fund, in 
practice the new long-term orthodox adjustment 
programmes have done very little to solve the cur-
rent crisis, inasmuch as they have not been very 
widely applied. Barely a dozen countries have par-
ticipated in the World Bank's structural adjustment 
A. T H E SHORTAGE O F EXTERNAL FINANCING 
Towards the end of 1983, seventeen Latin Amer-
ican and Caribbean countries had entered into 
adjustment agreements with the International 
Monetary Fund. Ten of these had signed Stand-
by agreements and seven had signed agreements 
under the Extended Fund Facility. At the same 
time, 12 of the countries in question had 
obtained loans under the Fund's Compensatory 
Financing Facility (CFF), ten of them on the same 
date that they had arranged for their adjustment 
programmes and two of them on a later date. 
One of these countries had also drawn a loan 
from the Fund's Buffer Stock Financing Facility 
(BSFF) (see table l).5 
4For critiques of the neoclassical or neoliberal inter-
pretation of underdevelopment and of the policies proposed 
under this approach for overcoming structural disequilibria 
see Aníbal Pinto, "Í alse dilemmas and real options in current 
Latin American debate", C.EPAL Review, No. 6 (second half of 
1978); Raúl Prebisch, "The neoclassical theories of economic 
programmes since this option was created in 1979, 
while, for some reason, between mid-1981 and late 
1982, the Fund severely restricted the number of 
agreements signed under its long-term facility. As a 
result, the great majority of deficit countries cur-
rently adjust their economies by applying the tradi-
tional Fund programmes, in which the main tools 
used are short-term demand management and, in 
particular, management of financial variables. In 
any event, an analysis of the few long-term pro-
grammes entered into with the Fund shows that 
management of financial variables still constitutes 
the essence of the adjustment strategy; the rest of 
this article will therefore concentrate mainly on this 
question.4 
liberalism", CEPAI. Review, No. 7 (April 1979); Aníbal Pinto, 
"The opening up of Latin America to the exterior", CEPAI. 
Review, No. 11 (August 1980); Celso Furtado, "Transnacio-
nalizaçâo e monetarismo", Pensamiento Iberoamericano, No. 1 
(January-June 1982) and Joseph Ramos, "Estabilización y 
libe rali zac ion económica en el Cono Sur", Estudios e Informes 
de la CEPAI., No. 38. 
5Three other countries in the region obtained Fund 
financing in 1983. In two cases (Belize and Bolivia), however, 
the loans were obtained under the Compensatory Financing 
Facility (CFF) and hence did not require the borrower to carry 
out an adjustment programme. In the other case, El Salva-
dor, the country's Stand-by agreement (SBA) expired in mid-
1983. 
Stand-by agreements (SBAS and Extended Facility (EFF) 
agreements differ from agreements covered by the Com-
pensatory Financing Facility (CFF) and the Buffer Stock 
Financing Facility (BSFF) both as regards level of financing 
and degree of conditionality. The maximum amount of re-
sources that may be obtained under Stand-by agreements and 
Extended Fund Facility agreements is considerably higher 
than the amount available under Compensatory Financing 
Facility and Buffer Stock Financing Facility agreements. 
However, disbursements of financing provided under Stand-
by agreements and Extended Fund Facility agreements are 
subject to certain conditions, whereas funds made available 
under Compensatory Financing Facility and Buffer Stock 
Financing Facility agreements are not conditioned; in other 
words, the borrower is not required to carry out an adjust-
II 
The recessive bias of the International Monetary Fund's 
adjustment programmes 
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It should be noted, in the first place, that 
the great majority of these adjustment pro-
grammes (SBA and EFF) did not enter into force 
until 1983; in other words, around one year and 
a half after the beginning of the worst economic 
recession experienced by the region since the 
great crisis of the 1930s. Indeed, between mid-
1981 and late 1982, only seven countries (Barba-
dos, October 1982; El Salvador, July 1982; 
Guatemala, November 1981; Haiti, August 
1982; Honduras , November 1982; Panama, 
April 1982, and Peru, June 1982) entered into 
adjustment agreements with the Fund, while the 
per capita product and gross international re-
serves were falling more or less sharply in almost 
all the 30 countries included in the region at that 
time.6 Of these seven countries, only three (Bar-
bados, Honduras and Peru) obtained, under the 
aforementioned agreements, financing beyond 
the regular credit tranche —i.e., an amount of 
more than 100% of their quotas in the Fund— 
and only one (Peru) borrowed under the ex-
ment programme. Stand-by agreements are also different 
from Extended Fund Facility agreements; maturities of 
Stand-by agreements range between one and two years, while 
Extended Fund Facility agreements have a maturity of three 
years. The total amount of resources that can be obtained 
under Extended Fund Facility agreements is also higher than 
that which can be obtained under Stand-by agreements. In 
general, Stand-by agreements call for "short-term" adjust-
ment programmes and Extended Fund Facility agreements 
for "long-term" programmes. For information on all the 
Fund's facilities, see International Monetary Fund, Inter-
national Financial Statistics, Volume xxxvn, No. 3 (March 
1984). 
tíA total of 13 countries obtained Fund financing during 
this period. In addition to those mentioned above, the Domi-
nican Republic (5/1982/42%), Guyana (11/1982/16%) and 
Uruguay (8/1982/44%) borrowed under the Buffer Stock 
Financing Facility. (The last figure in parentheses refers to 
the amount of Financing obtained with respect to the coun-
try's quota in the Fund.) It should be remembered, however, 
that access to the Compensatory Financing Facility and the 
Buffer Stock Financing Facility does not entail an obligation 
to apply an adjustment programme designed by the Fund. 
Also, Dominica and Jamaica signed Extended Fund Facility 
agreements in February and April 1981, i.e., prior to the 
period under consideration. Finally, Costa Rica signed a 
Stand-by agreement in December 1982 but did not receive 
the first funds until January 1983. This country had also 
entered into an extended Fund Facility agreement in June 
1981, but it was suspended in August 1981. 
tended Fund facility —a long-term adjustment 
programme.7 
In the second place, it should be noted that 
whereas the financing provided by the Fund in 
1981 and 1982 was equivalent to 19% of the 
current-account deficit of the Latin American 
countries which obtained Fund financing, it only 
covered 1% of Latin America's overall current 
account deficit in 1981 and 2% of the deficit 
recorded in 1982, when the adjustment had of 
necessity already begun in most of the countries 
of the region (see table 2). 
During 1983, twelve countries of the region 
entered into adjustment agreements with the 
Fund and the first long-term adjustment agree-
ments (EFF) to have been signed since mid-1981 
(except for the one signed by Peru in July 1982) 
were signed (see table l).8 Despite the fact that in 
most cases the financing obtained was close or 
equal to the maximum (150% of annual quota) 
allowed under the regulations in force for Stand-
by and EFF agreements and that disbursements 
were also made under the CFF and the BSFF, in 
general the intensity of the adjustment process 
radically increased. 
Because of the very magnitude of the adjust-
ment experienced by the region in 1983 —the 
current-account deficit was reduced by approx-
imately 80%, the financing granted by the Fund 
appears to be much more generous than it actual-
ly was, when one compares it with the ex post 
deficit (see table 2). While it is true that in some 
countries (Costa Rica and Haiti, for example) the 
adjustment was less stringent in 1983, it is no less 
true that these cases cannot be properly assessed 
without referring to the magnitude of the adjust-
ment they had undergone in previous years. In 
other cases, such as that of Uruguay, where ex 
7 The amounts of financing received in relation to quotas 
were as follows: Barbados, 125%; El Salvador, 67%; Guate-
mala, 25%; Haiti, 100%; Honduras, 150%; Panama,44% and 
Peru, 265%. It should be noted, however, that six of the seven 
countries in question also obtained CFF loans during that 
period. The dates and amounts (in relation toquotas) of these 
were as follows: Barbados, 10/1982, 51%; El Salvador, 7/ 
1981, 50% and 7/1982, 50%; Guatemala, 11/1981, 100%; 
Haiti, 12/1982, 49%; Honduras, 11/1982, 51%; and Peru, 
7/1982, 78%. 
8With the exception mentioned, these were the first FFF 
agreements to be signed in the entire world since 1981. 
Table 1 
FINANCIAL DATA PERTAINING T O AGREEMENTS BETWEEN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND T H E INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, Weekly Bulletin, several issues; and ECLAC, on the basis of official information. 
aIncludes agreements in force as at 1 December 1983. 
b Indudes financing from Compensatory Financing Facility as of dates of agreements (Stand-by and Extended Fund Facility) mentioned. However, also 
included is SDR 499 million obtained by Brazil from that Facility in December 1982 and SDR 12.6 million obtained by the Dominican Republic from the Buffer 
Stock Financing Facility (August 1983). 
Percentage. 
dAverage annual flow (without adjustments for suspension of drawings) to average value of SDR each year for all countries, except Dominica and Jamaica, 
for which actual figures are given. 
*This agreement was replaced by the agreement of 24 February 1983, which in turn was replaced by the agreement of 15 September 1983. 
fSurplus. 
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ante the level of financing provided by the Fund deficit, in the final analysis the adjustment pro-
appears to be relatively high in relation with the cess proceeded quite steadily. 
Table 2 
NET FINANCING OBTAINED BY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND AND BALANCES ON THEIR CAPITAL ACCOUNTS, 1981-1983 




















































- 1 7 
62 
- 3 9 





















































































































































29'1 u 501' ' 
58h 
Percentage variation 
of balance on 
capital account 
1981 






- 5 2 
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17 
- 1 6 
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- 5 2 
- 1 0 
- 2 9 
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- 7 9 
- 6 3 
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- 4 2 
- 1 8 
508 
- 9 8 
- 6 0 
24 
- 2 2 
54 
- 3 1 
4 
- 8 6 







- 4 4 
a 
- 9 
- 5 7 
- 3 4 
100 






- 2 9 
- 5 4 







Source; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Vol. xxxvii, No. 1, January 1984, and EC:I.AC, on the basis 
of official information. 
"Deficit, 
bChanged from deficit to surplus. 
'Countries which obtained Fund financing. 
dNot including Mexico. 
"Not including Barbados, Dominica, Grenada or Jamaica. 
'including Mexico. 
"All countries. 
hNot including Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada or Jamaica. 
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It is germane to ask why the Fund's response 
to the most serious economic crisis since the 
1930s was so limited. In effect, could it be that 
only 1% to 2% of the current-account deficit 
incurred by Latin America in 1981 and 1982 was 
the result of temporary external factors? Can 
almost all this deficit be attributed to a dispro-
portionate growth of domestic expenditure, to 
permanent deterioration of the terms of trade or 
to an irreversible rise in international interest 
rates? Moreover, how can it be said for sure that 
the deterioration in the terms of trade or the rise 
in interest rates will be permanent? And even if 
the deficit were attributable to those factors, what 
sense would there be in requiring countries to 
make adjustments immediately, as was in fact the 
case? There is no question that the magnitude of 
the Fund's response to the crisis in the region as a 
whole was closely related to the slow pace at 
which adjustment agreements were arranged. 
Nevertheless, also at issue is whether the amount 
of financing provided by the Fund once an 
agreement is signed is comparable to the magni-
tude of the deficit that is attributable to tempo-
rary external factors. 
As regards the slowness of the Fund's re-
sponse to the crisis, there is no denying that a 
country must be willing to resort to the Fund in 
order for it to be able to grant resources and that 
there was a more or less pronounced reluctance 
on the part of many countries to resort to the 
Fund. Nevertheless, it should also be remem-
bered that the fact that a government wishes to 
negotiate an agreement with the Fund does not 
mean that such an agreement will be signed ex-
peditiously or even that it will be signed at all: in 
practice, negotiations tend to be very prolonged 
and complicated. It is more to the point, then, to 
find out whether the reluctance of many coun-
tries to resort to the Fund and the delays in sign-
ing agreements reflect shortsightedness on the 
part of governments or deficiencies in the Fund's 
approach. 
As a general rule, governments are reluctant 
to take decisions that entail political costs over the 
short-term or during the term of its mandate. 
Also, they often act as if they thought they might 
be able to avoid costs that are actually inevitable. 
However, many observers have argued, in dif-
ferent media and fora, that the main reason 
why negotiations on adjustment agreements 
usually take so long is that the Fund's policies are 
excessively strict.9 And since it can be shown that 
the Fund's adjustment programmes do have se-
rious defects, governments' reluctance to follow 
its formula word for word is well-founded as long 
as they have other options. One of the main pur-
poses of this article is to show that this is the case; 
at this point, however, what we wish to stress is 
that, according to several experts, the Fund de-
cided to toughen its policies just at the time when 
the current economic crisis broke out.10 
Thus, at a recent conference on Fund poli-
cies, it was stated that around the middle of 1981, 
this institution had made the conditions for 
obtaining financing from it much more strin-
gent. 
9See for example, United Nations, "Balance of pay-
ments adjustment process in developing countries", New 
York, UNDP/UNCTAD Project I N T / 7 5 / 0 1 5 , January 1979; The 
South-North Conference on the International Monetary Sys-
tem and the New International Order, held at Dar-es-Salaam, 
Tanzania, from 30 June to 3 July 1980, the papers of which 
were published in Development Dialogue, 1980:2; Sidney Dell, 
"El Fondo Monetario Internacional y el principio de con-
dicionalidad", Revista de la CEPAL, No. 13 (April 1981); and 
Dragoslav Avramovic, "The role of the International Mone-
tary Fund: the disputes, the qualifications and the future", 
paper presented at the North-South Round Table, Tokyo, 
1982, and also published in John Williamson, éd., IMF Con-
ditionality, op. cit. 
10SeeJohn Williamson (éd.), IMF Conditionality, Washing-
ton, D.C., Institute for International Economics, 1983, parti-
cularly the article by John Williamson himself, "The lending 
policies of the International Monetary Fund". On this same 
question, a new book, which reached us just as this article was 
going to press, has the following to say: "Around the middle 
of 1981 the experiment with a more relaxed attitude towards 
conditionality was put sharply into reverse, for a number of 
reasons. The effects of the second oil shock and of the anti-
inflationary policies of the governments of major industrial 
countries combined to induce an unexpectedly sharp de-
terioration in the terms of trade of oil-importing developing 
countries. In consequence their balance-of-payments situa-
tion worsened rapidly and a large proportion of the Stand-by 
and EFF programmes entered into during 1979 and 1980 ran 
into serious difficulties ... In the meantime the Fund had 
begun to experience liquidity problems, with its resources 
inadequate to cope with the emerging scale of the problem. 
Another critical factor was the election in November 1980 of 
the Reagan Administration which —after a time lag— took a 
much harder line in the Fund's councils and which was able to 
form an effective coalition with other industrial countries, 
such as Germany and the United Kingdom, against the pre-
vious liberalization. Moreover, there had always been unease 
among some of the Fund's staff about the liberalization ... 
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Another observer who shares this interpreta-
tion has also stressed the striking change between 
the proportion of financing that is not con-
ditioned and that which is. This is the main 
reason why, in the view of this author, during 
the first six months of 1982, the net new financ-
ing provided by the Fund was negative "... during 
the worst recession since the 1930s".11 
The Fund disagrees with the view that con-
ditionally was toughened at the beginning of the 
economic crisis. According to the Managing 
Director of the Fund, "... what has really hap-
pened is not a tightening of conditionality per se, 
Anyway, there is no questioning that a reversal occurred. To 
governments negotiating with the Fund in 1982 the message 
was an unwelcome one: more preconditions, including 
greater insistence on exchange rate depreciations; a wider 
r a n g e of policy c o m m i t m e n t s wri t ten in to the pro-
grammes; ... a reduced willingness to grant waivers and mod-
ifications; shorter-leash programmes with less front-end 
loading. In fact, if we return to the various dimensions of 
conditionality, there was apparently a tightening up on 
almost all of them. There was also a shift back towards the 
short-term approach. One-year programmes were restored 
as the normal order of the day, although an attempt was 
made to retain some longer-term thinking by planning on the 
basis of a succession of one-year programmes. The EFF was 
put firmly on the back burner." See Tony Killick, "The im-
pact of Fund stabilization programmes", in Tony Killick, éd., 
The quest for economic stabilization (the IMF and the Third World) 
(London, Heinemann Educational Books, in association with 
the Overseas Development Institute, 1984), pp. 211 and 212. 
MG.K. Helleiner, "The IMF and Africa in the 1980s", 
Essays in International Finance (International Finance Section, 
Department of Economics, Princeton University) No. 152 
(July 1983), Helleiner (p. 13) notes that "reliance on bor-
rowed resources and a policy of'enlarged access' rather than 
on quota expansion and SDR allocations generated the result, 
no doubt intentionally, that about 80 per cent of its lending in 
the 1981-1982 period was accompanied by stringent condi-
tions, because countries drawing on the Fund found them-
selves moving rapidly into the upper credit tranches, where 
stiff conditions must be met. By contrast, during 1974-1975, 
the last period of major net lending activity, the IMF imposed a 
similar degree of conditionality on only one-third of its 
lending", 
Later on (p. 14) he states; "The IMF'S shift toward the 
imposition of more and tougher conditions upon its lending 
has been accompanied by a hardening of the terms. Interest 
rates charged on IMF credit have been rising relative to 
market rates, IMF lending that is financed by borrowing 
rather than by agreed quota expansion must earn interest 
rates adequate to service the IMF'S resulting debt. The failure 
to increase IMF quotas rapidly enough to meet demands for 
IMF credit thus implied the imposition of commercial rates of 
interest on its loans." 
it is y worsening of the external conditions of the 
country in question and the need for more ad-
justments".12 
All these interpretations show that the Fund 
failed to provide support, or at least timely sup-
port, during the crisis. The question is whether 
the procyclical policy applied by the Fund during 
this economic crisis is justified or not. 
In the aforementioned interview, Mr. Laro-
sière implies that the worsening of external con-
ditions (i.e., accounts) was entirely due to an 
irreversible deterioration in the terms of trade 
and to faulty domestic financial policies. This 
argument may be valid for 1979-1980, when the 
second oil shock occurred, but it is not convincing 
for 1981 onwards, inasmuch as it does not take 
into account the fact that a significant part of the 
deterioration in current-account positions from 
that year onwards was brought about by drops 
—presumably temporary— in the prices of thç 
great majority of commodities,13 by the unpre-
cedented increase in international interest 
rates,14 and also, in 1982 and 1983, by the con-
siderable reduction of financing from private in-
ternational banks.15 
12See "A conversation with Mr. de Larosière", Finance 
and Development, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 1982), p. 5. 
l 3Indeed, between 1980 and 1981, the average (simple) 
price of the 17 main export products (except petroleum) of 
Latin America fell by 12.3%;between 1981 and 1982, it fell by 
12.2%. In 1983 there was a slight recovery by comparison 
with 1982. Nonetheless, compared with 1980, the 1983 aver-
age price was still somewhat below 80% of the price prevailing 
in 1980. In 1983, the average unit value of exports of the 
non-oil-exporting countries of the region was 18% lower than 
in 1980, having fallen by 7% in 1981,6.7% in 1982 and 5% in 
1983. See ECLA, "Preliminary overview of the Latin American 
economy during 1983" (E/CEPAIÀ;.1279) Santiago, Chile, 29 
December 1983, tables 9 and 10. 
14On average, the international interest rate (I.IBOR) for 
six-month dollar deposits was 16.6% in 1981, compared with 
14% in 1980,12.2% in 1979 and 9.2% in 1978. In 1982, it fell 
to 13.5% and in 1983 to 9.5%. See Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company, World Financial Markets, January 1984, table 9. 
15In the absence of specific data on such financing, it 
should be noted that net inflow on Latin America's capital 
account fell by almost 54% in 1982 and 73% in 1983, after 
having risen by 47% in 1981. In 1983 net capital inflow was 
only 12%ofwha t i thadbeen in 1981 and 17% of what it had 
been in 1980. See ECLA, "Preliminary overview of the Latin 
American economy during 1983", op. cit., table 7 and Econom-
ic Survey of Latin America, 1982, Santiago, Chile, December 
1983 (E/CEPAL/L.286), table 30. 
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Although there was thus an objective basis 
—the lack of financing— for the drastic adjust-
ment which Latin America had to bear, the mag-
nitude of the adjustment seems to have been 
disproport ionate considering the origin and 
foreseeable duration of the causes of deteriora-
tion of the region's external accounts. The ad-
justment does not seem to have been efficient 
either as regards Latin America or as regards the 
international economy. Moreover, if all these ex-
ternal disturbances should turn out to be irre-
versible, sooner or later the countries of the re-
gion would be forced to stop meeting their exter-
nal commitments. 
Nevertheless, the timeliness and the quantity 
of financing provided by the Fund cannot be 
assessed without taking into account the per-
formance of the capital account, since the Fund 
itself holds that its role as a catalyst of financing 
from other sources is just as important as or more 
i m p o r t a n t t h a n the f inanc ing it d i rec t ly 
provides.16 
Viewed in this context, the Fund's action 
appears even less adequate: although the net in-
flow of capital to the countries which obtained 
Fund financing rose by around 6%, between 
1980 and 1981, it fell by 9% and 43% between 
1981 and 1982 and between 1982 and 1983. 
These figures hardly point to success in the 
Fund's role as a catalyst. Nevertheless, in light of 
the performance of the capital account of coun-
tries that did not resort to the Fund, it could be 
held that the decline in the net inflow of capital to 
countries that did draw resources from it would 
have been even greater, during 1982-1983, had 
Fund support not been forthcoming. Indeed, in 
those two years, the net inflow of capital tp the 
region as a whole fell by 56% and 73%. The 
average variation in the balances of the countries 
that did not resort to the Fund was of course 
much more negative. On the other hand, in 1981 
the opposite was the case: net inflow of capital to 
the region rose by 44%, compared with a 6% 
increase for countries that resorted to the Fund 
(see table 2). 
In short, an appraisal of the Fund's role as a 
catalyst leads to ambiguous conclusions when 
16See again "A conversation with Mr. de Larosière", op. 
cit., 1982. 
both the above criteria are considered, particu-
larly if global figures are disaggregated.17 
It is not clear, however, whether either one of 
these criteria is the most suitable one. Indeed, 
from both the analytical standpoint and that 
of the Fund's by-laws, it would appear that 
an efficiency cri ter ion would be the most 
useful and suitable one to use. With this criterion, 
the performance of the Fund, both as regards the 
financing it provides directly and as regards that 
which it promotes indirectly, should be evaluated 
in terms of the magnitude of the current-account 
deficit which is attributable to temporary exter-
nal factors. 
It must be recognized, however, that no mat-
ter how inadequate Fund financing might be, 
without it the adjustment might have been much 
more stringent, as Fund representatives are 
prone to remind us.18 Another possibility often 
overlooked by those who advocate this type 
of approach is that had this been the case, many 
countries would have had to choose between eat-
ing or continuing to serve their external debt. 
In any event, when viewed in this light, the 
appropriate criterion is not set by past results or 
by future goals established in the adjustment 
agreement itself, nor even by efficiency consid-
erations, but rather by what would have hap-
pened in the absence of Fund financing and in-
vestment programmes.19 This type of evaluation 
17As is often the case, the figures for one, two or three 
countries strongly affect totals or averages. For example, 
although the net inflow of capital to all countries which drew 
resources from the Fund fell by 43% in 1983, the figure 
would be - 1 8 % if Mexico and Brazil were left out. Likewise, 
while the total capital account deficit of countries that did not 
resort to the Fund in 1983 rose by almost 190%, if Colombia 
and Trinidad and Tobago were left out, the deficit for this 
group would only rise by a little over 17%. (For data on the 
region's balance of payments for the period 1980-1983, see 
ECLA, "Preliminary overview of the Latin American economy 
during 1983", op. cit., table 7; and Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1982, op. cit., table 30. See also International Mone-
tary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Vol. xxxvii, 
No. 1, January 1984. 
l8See, for example, Manuel Guitián, "Economic Man-
agement and International Monetary Fund Conditionality", 
in Tony Killkk, éd., Adjustment and financing in the developing 
world: the role of the International Monetary Fund (London, In-
ternational Monetary Fund, in association with the Overseas 
Development Institute, 1982). 
I 9/«d, pp. 99-101. 
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—by counter-factual hypothesizing— is very in-
teresting but begs the issue: whether or not the 
Fund is supposed to promote international 
prosperity and stability and, if it is, whether or 
not it is doing so.20 Being as it is an eloquent 
appraisal method, it could also be used as a way of 
dodging responsibility for the disaster that has 
occurred. 
The paucity of external financing with re-
spect to the exigencies of the current economic 
crisis seems mostly to reflect the fact that the 
procedure used to set and readjust the countries' 
quotas in the Fund is not really based on efficien-
cy criteria,21 although it may in part be influ-
enced by the Fund's decision of mid-1981 to 
toughen conditionality. And there is no doubt 
that if behind it all there is an adequate capacity 
or inclination to finance an efficient adjustment 
process, this process will perforce be more strin-
gent than necessary. At the same time, there is a 
risk that recession, such as the present one, will 
be unnecessarily severe. But it must be admitted 
that there is no easy solution to the problem, 
inasmuch as it calls for unusual initiatives such as 
greater disbursements of resources from credi-
tor countries or some kind of joint action on the 
part of debtor countries.2 Nevertheless, there 
20This matter has been discussed by Sidney Dell, in 
"Stabilization: the Political Economy of Overkill", in John 
Williamson, éd., op. cit. 
2
'See Helleiner, op. cit., 1983. 
22It is conceivable, however, that more flexible use of the 
front-end loading procedure by the Fund could have helped, 
precisely because of its catalytic effect, to attenuate if not to 
halt the deterioration of external accounts. Although the 
Fund is empowered to follow this procedure in cases of very 
serious imbalances, it has been reluctant to do so, as may be 
seen from the recent experiences of the countries of the 
region (see table 1 and note 10). On the other hand, it is 
doubtful whether more extensive use of the Extended Fund 
Facility, which covers long-term adjustment programmes, 
would have made adjustment any less stringent, since the 
level of financing that could be obtained annually by means of 
the EFF is no greater than could be obtained from an SBA. In 
addition, countries can obtain successive SBA» or obtain an EFF 
loan following an SBA, or vice versa, SBA* provide no advan-
tage other than that which might be had from knowing fur-
ther in advance the amount of resources that are potentially 
available from the Fund- This could be important, but since 
adjustment policies and conditions for the disbursement of 
funds are renegotiated each year of an EFF loan, the probabil-
ity of obtaining all the financing originally envisaged is not as 
great as it might seem. 
are other significant deficiencies in the Fund's 
approach that could be remedied at no cost. 
B. T H E DEFICIENCIES O F CONDITIONALITY 
AND OTHER DOMESTIC 
ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 
1. The rationale and implementation of the 
Fund's programme 
a) The policy mix 
i) Definitions 
It is useful to differentiate the Fund's adjust-
ment policies into performance criteria, pre-
conditions and policy understandings.23 
The main elements of the Fund's adjustment 
agreements are its so-called performance criteria, 
which not only concern the variables on which 
economic policy must act, within the framework 
of the orthodox paradigm, in order to orient the 
adjustment process but are used as mechanisms 
for following-up on and monitoring progress to-
wards achievement of the macroeconomic tar-
gets established in the agreement, and, as such, 
de te rmine whether or not the Fund's dis-
bursements are made as originally scheduled. 
This conditionality function may also have a sig-
nificant impact on the level of financing from 
other sources, particularly from private inter-
national banks. When they are met, the perfor-
mance criteria serve as a sort of "seal of approval" 
of the management of domestic economic policy 
that can be used to advantage on the inter-
national financial market . Failure to meet 
performance criteria could limit or even close a 
country's access to that market. 
Performance criteria are established for each 
trimester covered by the adjustment agreement 
and, traditionally, for a particular date during 
that period. Fund financing is also made avail-
able on a quarterly basis, generally in equal 
23See Joseph Gold, "Conditionality", Pamphlet Señes, 
No. 34 (Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 
1979); John Williamson, "The Lending Policies of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund", in Williamson, op. cit.; William 
H.L. Day, "Domestic Credit and Money Ceilings under 
Alternative Exchange Rate Régimes", IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 
26, No. 3 (September 1979); Manuel Guitián, op. cit., 1981; 
and Russel Kincaid, "What Are Credit Ceilings?", Finance and 
Development", Vol. 20, No. 1 (March 1983). 
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amounts throughout the programme, and is sub-
ject to full compliance with all the performance 
criteria established in the agreement. Failure to 
meet any of these criteria automatically provides 
sufficient grounds for suspending financing be-
cause, for the Fund, any discrepancy between 
actual results and performance criteria is asignal 
that the adjustment is not being carried out prop-
erly and as agreed —unless evidence is provided 
to the contrary. If the discrepancy in question 
only represents a minor departure from a quan-
titative performance criterion, the IMP may waive 
the criterion that has not been satisfied and re-
sume disbursements. Otherwise in order for the 
country to be able to receive further Fund financ-
ing, the original programme will have to be mod-
ified or a new agreement negotiated. 
Pre-conditions and policy understanding 
both entail certain obligations as regards the use 
of what might, in general, be called policy tools, 
e.g., the exchange rate, government expenditure 
or interest rates. Nevertheless, pre-conditions 
are different from policy commitments because, 
as the name suggests, they refer to measures that 
must be taken before an adjustment agreement 
officially begins and financing is disbursed. 
Moreover, for obvious reasons, pre-conditions 
usually consist mainly of discreet changes in the 
exchange rate and measures to support it, where-
as policy understandings may relate to any mea-
sure considered necessary or useful to achieve 
the targets set out in the adjustment programme. 
It should also be noted that, contrary to the 
case with performance criteria, failure to comply 
with a policy understanding does not entail auto-
matic interruption of disbursements of Fund 
financing. Nevertheless, these understandings 
are included within the concept of conditionality 
which governs use of Fund resources; non-
compliance could eventually affect a country's 
access to Fund financing. 
T o understand the rationale —or lack of 
rationale— underlying the types of policies 
which the Fund employs in its adjustment pro-
grammes, one has to know more about the mac-
roeconomic model it uses. A preliminary analysis 
will enable us to distinguish between policy mea-
sures which work through monetary variables 
and those which work through prices. In general 
such a dichotomy also obtains with respect to 
those variables that are chosen as performance 
criteria and those that do not automatically con-
dition the disbursement of Fund resources. 
ii) Theoretical underpinnings 
—The means of payment (the monetary approach 
to the balance of payments).24 As in the case of a 
closed economy, the monetarist approach to eco-
nomic policy in an open economy begins by 
assuming a stable demand function for real 
monetary balances.25 However, contrary to the 
case of a closed economy, in which the authority 
is able to control the stock of money —which 
means that management of economic policy is 
reduced, essentially, to determining the trend of 
demand for money and the assets of which it is 
constituted—, in an open economy with a fixed 
exchange rate, the monetary authority cannot 
control either the stock or flow of money. The 
only thing it can control is the component which 
originates from domestic sources, i.e., net 
domestic assets {which consist mainly but not ex-
clusively of net domestic credit). 
If the exchange rate were absolutely flexible, 
the case of an open economy would be similar, in 
principle, to that of a closed economy as far as the 
possibility of managing the money stock is con-
24For a discussion of the monetarist approach to the 
balance of payments, see Robert Triffin, "Esbozo general de 
un análisis de las series estadísticas monetarias de América 
Latina sobre bases uniformes y comparables", in Banco de 
México, Memoria: Primera Reunión de Técnicos sobre Problemas 
de Banca Central del Continente Americano (Mexico, 1946); |.J. 
Polak, "Monetary Analysis of Income Formation and Pay-
ments Problems", IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 6 (November 1957); 
Harry G. Johnson, "The Monetary Approach to Balance of 
Payments Theory ", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analy-
sis, Vol. vu (1972); Manuel Cuidan, "Credit versus Money as 
an Instrument of Control", IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 29, Novem-
ber 1973. See also Jacob A. Frenkel and Harry G. Johnson, 
éd., The Monetary Approach to títe Balance of Payments (London, 
George Allen Unwin Ltd., 1976); International Monetary 
Fund, The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments: a 
compilation of studies prepared by Fund staff members, Washing-
ton, D.C., 1977; Jacob A. Frenkel and Harry G.Johnson, éd., 
The Economics of Exchange Rates (Reading, Mass., Addison 
Wesley Publishing Co., 1978); and Manuel Guitián, op. cit., 
1982. 
2511 also assumes stable functions for the non-banking 
public's demand for cash (in relation to the demand for 
money in the form of bank deposits) and for banks' demand 
for reserves (in relation to their investments); in other words, 
it also tends to assume a stable function for the monetary 
multiplier. 
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cerned. Indeed, an excessive supply of means of 
payment with respect to demand for real mone-
tary balances is eliminated through a rise in the 
price level, including the price of foreign ex-
change, i.e., the exchange rate. However —and 
this is very important— as long as the authorities 
allow concern for exchange rate stability to con-
dition their other policies, the money stock be-
comes endogenous. In other words, if in practice 
the authority is not prepared to allow the ex-
change rate to freely fluctuate, it will not be able 
to determine the stock of means of payment 
either. 
As regards net domestic assets, the difference 
between an open economy with a fixed exchange 
rate and others is determined by the fact that in 
an open economy in which the exchange rate is 
not entirely flexible, the non-financial sector can 
bring its nominal money holdings in line with its 
demand for money by means of its transactions 
with the rest of the world. When faced with a 
surplus of money, the non-bank public can adjust 
its holdings to the desired level by "exporting" 
the surplus to the rest of the world; and in the 
opposite case, it can "import" what it needs from 
abroad. In other words, the public can reconcile 
its nominal holdings of money with its demand 
for means of payment by producing a deficit 
(reducing the supply of net external assets and 
hence of money) or a surplus (increasing the 
supply of net external assets and of money) in the 
balance of payments.26 
Thus, in an economy with a fixed exchange 
rate, the authorities will find their efforts to con-
trol the money supply frustrated to the extent 
that their target does not coincide with the 
quantity of money which the public is willing to 
hold. Moreover, the existence of equilibrium be-
tween the supply of and demand for money does 
not guarantee a parallel equilibrium in the bal-
2,
*It should be noted that in order for equivalence to 
obtain between the loss (or accumulation) of international 
reserves and the reduction (or increase) of means of pay-
ment, the overall payments balance must reflect the position 
of the entire banking system, or the monetary multiplier must 
equal one. Nevertheless, a constant monetary multiplier 
would be sufficient to validate the substantive results of the 
approach. It is also assumed that the monetary authority 
cannot permanently compensate for ("sterilize") the mone-
tary impact of external transactions. 
ance of payments (this being understood as the 
balance which the authority considers sustain-
able and desirable) since, in principle, equilib-
rium in the monetary market is compatible with 
any composition of net external assets and net 
domestic assets. This being the case, the author-
ities would only be able to meet their overall 
external-accounts target by bringing the creation 
of net domestic assets in line with that target, on 
the one hand, and with the demand for money, 
on the other. In other words, in order to satisfy 
simultaneously the public's demand for real 
monetary balances and their overall goal for the 
balance of payments —their demand for net ex-
ternal assets— the authorities must adjust the 
supply of domestic assets. Moreover, because 
management of this financial variable is the key 
to the achievement of simultaneous equilibria in 
the monetary and the external markets, it is of 
necessity also crucial to the attainment of equilib-
rium in the market for goods and services, given 
the initial assumption of a stable demand func-
tion for real monetary balances.27 
These results point clearly to one perfor-
mance criterion: the management of net domes-
tic assets (of net domestic credit). 
As regards domestic and external financing of the 
public sector, just as equilibrium in the money mar-
ket can be achieved with any combination of net 
external and domestic assets, the global balance-
of-payments target can be achieved with any 
number of combinations of current-account and 
capital-account balances and the residual expan-
sion of net domestic assets can arise from dif-
ferent allocations as between the public and the 
private sectors. As a general rule, therefore, 
programming the supply of net domestic assets 
will not by itself suffice to achieve a sustainable 
balance-of-payments position or to promote 
growth and efficiency of investment; to achieve 
these objectives, the management of net domes-
27When equilibria are achieved in N-1 markets, they are 
insured on all markets (here N = 3). However, general equilib-
ria of flows do not necessarily imply equilibria of stocks (in 
this case, money and net international reserves) in each 
period, unless stock equilibria are initially obtained. More-
over, inclusion of a securities market would strengthen the 
results of the model, inasmuch as it would make it possible to 
take into account the links between credit, interest rates and 
the balance of payments (see Manuel Guitián, op. at,, 1973). 
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tic assets would have to go hand-in-hand with 
measures designed to affect the composition of 
the balance-of-payments and the sectoral dis-
tribution of credit. 
T h e idea of a sus ta inable balance-of-
payments position has to do with how much of 
the current-account deficit can be Financed over 
the long-term and, consequently, with the econ-
omy's capacity to absorb (spend) available re-
sources {real and financial, domestic and exter-
nal) productively. Since the counterpart of a cur-
rent-account deficit is, broadly speaking capital 
imports, the achievement of a sustainable exter-
nal accounts position entails limiting external in-
debtedness so as to bring it in line with said capac-
ity. For reasons which are not obvious from this 
analytical point of view, however, the Fund only 
recommends a restriction of the external indebt-
edness of the public sector.28 This policy consti-
tutes another performance criterion. 
In order to protect the level of activity and 
the growth of production capacity at a time when 
restrictions are being placed on the supply of 
domestic credit and on external indebtedness, it 
is necessary to implement measures to channel 
available credit towards the financing of invest-
ment, including working capital (instead of to-
wards consumption) and, in particular, towards 
more productive investment. For reasons that 
possibly have to do with its praxis, the Fund has 
pursued these objectives by specifically restrict-
ing bank financing of public-sector expendi-
tures.29 This policy is also used as a performance 
criterion. 
As regards the public-sector deficit, ceilings on 
the public sector's external and domestic in-
debtedness with banks entail a corresponding 
restriction on its magnitude, the degree of which 
varies according to the level of development of 
the domestic capital market. In the extreme 
—but not necessarily unusual— event that there 
a 8State-guaranteed private external indebtedness is 
sometimes included as well. 
2 9Although the Central Bank cannot control its net 
domestic assets unless it is able to limit its public-sector financ-
ing, the issue here is the creation and allocation of credit by 
the entire financial system. This predisposition against the 
public sector is apparently based on the premise that when 
credit is scarce, the State always is able to outcompete the 
private sector for it. 
should be no organized market for financial 
assets outside the banking system, this restriction 
is, in principle, rigorous, since deficit spending 
and the creation of money are one and the same. 
Otherwise, these restrictions do not strictly limit 
the public-sector deficit. Nevertheless, as is the 
case when there is no capital market, there is a 
limitation on the creation of credit and the public 
sector augments its absorption of bank resources, 
the expansion of deficit spending beyond these 
restrictions implies that the total amount of 
monetary resources available for financing pri-
vate sector expenditure must be reduced pari 
passu. Therefore, when there is a domestic capital 
market it would be germane to accompany res-
trictions on credit with a performance criterion 
relating to the magnitude of the public-sector 
deficit. 
These considerations emphasize the link that 
may exist between the public-sector deficit and 
the creation of money, on the one hand, and 
between the public-sector deficit and private in-
vestment, on the other, and hence the role that 
deficit spending can play in generating external 
and domestic disequilibria. It has been suggested 
that this approach might be considered a "fiscal" 
rather than a "monetary" one. In any event, 
when there is no capital market or when it is only 
beginning to develop, restricting the growth of 
the means of payment to a rate compatible with 
financial equilibrium will necessarily mean re-
ducing the public-sector deficit. 
As regards net external assets, the purpose of 
restricting the expansion of net domestic assets 
as well as of limiting domestic and external 
financing of public-sector expenditures is to ad-
just the balance of payments to a target that is 
considered viable. Consequently, if these per-
formance criteria are met, it should be possible to 
achieve the external-accounts target, provided 
the assumptions and parameters of the model 
are valid. Nonetheless, this target is also included 
as a performance criterion in the Fund's adjust-
ment programmes. 
In summary, the monetarist nature of the 
paradigm largely explains how most of the per-
formance criteria are chosen. From its neoclassi-
cal background (the belief that international effi-
ciency and prosperity are maximized in markets 
that are free of such interferences as controls on 
capital flows, tariffs or quotas) issues another 
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criterion, the only one that is not o í a quantitative 
nature, i.e., that no new obstacles to the interna-
tional flow of goods, services and capital must be 
introduced. The remaining criterion, i.e., that 
arrears in payment must be eliminated, is also 
related to it. 
Performance criteria for almost all adjust-
ment programmes include restrictions on the fol-
lowing: 1) net domestic assets (domestic credit, 
plus certain minor assets, minus bank deposits of 
the government and other secondary liabilities); 
2) net domestic credit to the non-financial public 
sector (domestic credit to the State, minus bank 
deposits of the government); 3) external indebt-
edness of the public sector; 4) net external assets 
(gross international reserves minus short-term 
external indebtedness), and 5) the introduction 
of new measures restricting external t rade, 
remittances of factor service payments, or capital 
flows. In some cases, the following may also be 
included: 6) elimination of arrears in external 
payments and 7) restriction of the magnitude of 
the deficit of the non-financial public sector. 
Criteria relating to the financial sector could 
in principle apply to the Central Bank or to the 
entire banking system, depending on which is 
more stable, the monetary multiplier or the pub-
lic's demand for money.30 The criterion relating 
to the overall deficit of the non-financial public 
sector can be eliminated when there is no capital 
30As is known, the monetary multiplier is derived from 
the public's preferences regarding the distribution of its 
money holdings between cash and bank deposits, those of the 
commercial banks as regards the relationship between their 
reserves and their liabilities, and the reserve requirements 
established by the monetary authority; in other words, its 
value depends on the demand for the monetary base (cash 
outside banks plus bank reserves). If the demand for the 
monetary base were unstable, restricting the net domestic 
assets of the Central Bank could hinder the achievement of 
any target for net external assets, regardless of whether it 
applies to the Central Bank or to the banking system, since 
the Financial sector is able, through its transactions with the 
rest of the world, to bring its nominal money holdings in line 
with its demand for means of payment. In this case, in order 
to achieve the balance-of-payments target, the monetary au-
thority must in fact compensate for the fluctuation of the 
monetary multiplier by varying its stock of net domestic 
assets. On the other hand, if the demand for money were 
unstable, the achievement of any balance-of-payments target, 
would involve the adjustment of the entire banking system's 
stock of net domestic assets. 
market outside the banking system and the one 
relating to external indebtedness can be ex-
tended to State-guaranteed private indebtedness 
if it is held that the State's total obligations are 
excessive. Finally, the criterion relating to pay-
ment arrears is obviously only applicable in cer-
tain cases. 
The criteria relating to monetary aggregates 
are established as minimum (net external assets) 
or maximum (net domestic assets and net domes-
tic credit to the public sector) levels for a given 
day in each quarter during the life of the agree-
ment. The criterion relating to the total deficit of 
the non-financial public sector is usually set on an 
annual basis, while the one relating to external 
indebtedness of the public sector usually in-
volves loans for terms of less than ten years, espe-
cially loans for terms of less than five years (ex-
cept short-term supplier loans). 
—Prices. The other major policies which the 
Fund employs in its adjustment programmes 
have to do with prices; however, these are not 
applied as performance criteria. Of the measures 
which are usually required as pre-conditions or 
policy understanding, the ones that are crucial to 
the achievement of external and internal balance 
are those pertaining to public finance, the ex-
change rate, salaries and wages and interest 
rates. We shall now discuss the latter three. 
As regards the exchange rate? ' if it is fixed, an 
excessive supply of money will lead to a deficit in 
the global balance of payments. It is evident, 
3 ,See Sidney S. Alexander, "Effects of a devaluation 
on a trade balance", IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 2 (April 1952); S.C. 
Tsiang, "The role of money in trade-balance stability: syn-
thesis of the elasticity and absorption approach", American 
Economic Review, September 1961; Manuel Cuitián, "The 
effects of changes in the exchange rate on output, prices and 
the balance of payments", Journal of International Economics, 
Vol. 6, No. 1 (February 1976); Carl P. Blackwell, "Reflections 
on the monetary approach to the balance of payments", pa-
per presented at the Third Conference of Central Banks of 
the Pacific Basin on Econometric Models, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 8-11 November 1977; Harry G.Johnson, "Money, 
balance of payments theory and the international monetary 
problem", Essays in International Finance (Princeton, Princeton 
University, Depar tment of Economics, 1977, No. 124, 
November 1977); Jacob A. Frenkel and Harry G. Johnson, 
op. cit., 1972; John F.O. Bilson, "Recent developments in 
monetary models of open economies", IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 
26, No. 2 (June 1979); Joanne Salop and Eric Spitaller, "Why 
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however, that this type of disequilibrium can be 
eliminated through transactions with the rest of 
the world only as the monetary authority has or is 
able to obtain a sufficient amount of external 
assets and does not hinder the international flow 
of goods, services and capital. If international 
reserves run out or fall to a level the authority 
considers to be the minimum allowable —or if 
the economy's capacity for external indebtedness 
becomes exhausted or reaches a level considered 
to be the maximum desirable— an excess supply 
of money will have to be eliminated by reducing 
the stock of net domestic assets and/or by a rise in 
prices, including the exchange rate. 
In such circumstances, the question arises 
whether it is advisable to choose between one 
policy or the other in order to orient the adjust-
ment process. The Fund's paradigm allows for 
the possibility of its being necessary to act directly 
on the exchange rate instead of depending solely 
on reducing the stock of domestically supplied 
means of payment, in order to achieve adjust-
ment without causing undue production and em-
ployment losses. One justification might be based 
on rigidities that render domestic price declines 
uncertain, irregular and slow or capital flows 
perverse or inelastic. Another might be that 
domestic markets for goods and assets were ad-
justing at different speeds. A devaluation might 
also be justified, from the orthodox point of view 
for purely pragmatic or strategic reasons, since a 
modification of the exchange rate is an alterna-
tive to the use of discretionary measures, such as 
tariffs, quotas or controls on capital movement, 
to offset excess demand. However, if there are 
rigidities in the economy's real prices a devalua-
tion can achieve no more than a monetary defla-
tion. 
In any event, it should be noted that within 
the framework of the monetarist paradigm, an 
does the current account matter?", IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 27 
(March 1980); Ronald I. McKinnon, "The exchange rate and 
macroeconomic policy: changing postwar perceptions",/our-
nal of Economic Literature, Vol. xix, No. 2 (June 1981), and the 
Report of the Conference on Exchange Rate Régimes and 
Policy Interdependence (sponsored by the International 
Monetary Fund and the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Washington, D.C., 31 August 1982), in IMF Staff Pa-
pers, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1983); in particular, see William 
H. Branson, "Economic structure and policy for external 
balance". 
external imbalance can only persist while, and to 
the extent that the supply of means of payment 
outstrips the demand for real monetary balances, 
regardless of what the initial causes of the malad-
justment may have been. Consequently, the op-
tion is not between devaluation or deflation, but 
rather between a modification of the exchange 
rate and the degree to which monetary and fiscal 
policies are to be restrictive. 
Let us assume that an excessive creation of 
domestic credit has led to a situation in which it is 
necessary to reverse, at least partially, the loss of 
international reserves. Let us assume, moreover, 
that the demand for real monetary balances has 
at the same time stopped growing—perhaps be-
cause of this same external restriction. 
If the exchange rate is not adjusted it will be 
necessary to create a shortage of means of pay-
ment to achieve the balance-of-payments sur-
plus, and this implies that the absolute stock of 
net domestic assets must be reduced. Doing this 
to reach an acceptable level of net external assets 
means, in turn, slashing the stock of net domestic 
credit outstanding to the private sector and/or 
achieving a public-sector budget surplus. 
On the other hand, devaluation by trans-
forming the value of the stock of net domestic 
assets into one that is compatible with the de-
mand for real monetary balances, would "vali-
date" the past expansion of the stock of domes-
tically supplied money. In other words, by in-
creasing the domestic price level, devaluation 
creates an excess demand for money and thereby 
makes it possible to achieve the desired balance-
of-payments surplus without having to diminish 
the stock of net domestic assets and, thus, without 
having to reduce the indebtedness of the private 
sector or achieve a surplus in the public sector's 
budget,32 what is needed is monetary and fiscal 
policies that will check the domestic creation of 
money. Otherwise the excess demand for real 
balances will be decreased, both directly and in-
directly. 
*
,aTo the extent that a devaluation leads to a rise in the 
price level, it has the side-effect of reducing the real value of 
non-readjustable financial assets such as the money stock. If 
the demand for money is a demand for real monetary bal-
ances, when the level of prices goes up there will be an excess 
demand for money given the existing stock, unless the public 
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When there are rigidities in the economy 
that make it impossible to offset a drop in the 
means of payment with an immediate deflation 
of the domestic level of prices or surplus in the 
overall balance of payments, domestic expendi-
ture and hence the level of domestic activity must 
fall, to restore balance in the monetary market, 
i.e., to eliminate the shortage of means of 
payment.3'1 Moreover, considering the potential 
output trend, unrecoverable output losses will be 
sustained so long as and to the extent that the 
reduction of the money stock is not entirely offset 
by adjustments in relative domestic prices and/or 
the overall balance of transactions with the rest of 
the world. 
If at the same time the rigidities are uneven 
as between the different markets, so that adjust-
ment processes are more speedy and uniform in 
the assets market than in the markets for factors 
and goods and services, the brunt of the balance-
of-payments adjustment will fall on the capital 
account. Thus, an adjustment policy that de-
pends exclusively on monetary deflation will not, 
under such circumstances, be sufficient in and of 
itself to e n s u r e a sus ta inable balance-of-
payments position, even if it were capable of 
achieving the desired improvement without 
causing upheavals in domestic production. In 
such circumstances the authority would have to 
use an instrument that would have a more direct 
effect on relative prices, i.e., the exchange rate. 
Finally, the prevalence in the economy of 
expectations contrary to those required for an 
efficient adjustment via monetary deflation 
expects this increase to persist, that is, to turn into inflation (in 
which case the demand for money may even drop). An excess 
demand for money can only be eliminated, in the context of 
this approach, by means of an increase in the interest rate, a 
decrease in income, an increase in expected inflation or an 
increase in the supply of means of payment. The simul-
taneous existence of a restrictive monetary policy suggests 
that any increase in the supply of money would have to come 
from foreign sources—from balance-of-payments surplus— 
and this is in fact the aim. 
3 i lThere may also be rigidities that make it impossible to 
immediately implement a monetary deflation. Also, if there is 
no change in relative domestic prices the reduction of domes-
tic expenditure will have a disproportionate effect on the 
domestic product, unless the marginal propensity to import is 
greater than 1/2. 
would suffice to frustrate it. For example, if a 
devaluation is expected, interest rates-might have 
to reach levels that, as far as the evolution of eco-
nomic activity is concerned, would be intolerably 
high before the shortage of money could be 
eliminated. 
On the other hand, an exchange rate hike, in 
addi t ion to being implementable instanta-
neously, produces a pervasive modification of 
relative domestic prices, unless some real prices, 
either for goods, factors or assets, are so rigid 
that they absolutely cannot be brought down. In 
the absence of such rigidity, devaluation would 
be preferable to monetary deflation as far as the 
effect on the stability of the product and employ-
ment and the viability of the balance of payments 
are concerned even if some nominal prices were 
resistant to decline. When and to the extent that 
domestic expenditure on imports and exportable 
goods is diverted to non-tradeable goods and to 
import substitutes and the factors of production 
are re-allocated from the sectors producing non-
tradeables to those producing tradeable goods, a 
real devaluation compensates for the excess de-
mand for real balances to which it gives rise. It 
thus reduces the extent of the depression of out-
put below the actual or the potential level of 
production needed to restore money market 
equilibrium. 
If a modification of the real exchange rate 
were not sufficient to improve the current 
account, it would not matter, for the attainment 
of external equilibrium, whether the nominal ex-
change were raised or the domestic price level 
were lowered. If the economy has rigidities that 
make a real devaluation impossible, then there 
would be no advantage to choosing devaluation 
over monetary deflation. Moreover, under such 
circumstances, devaluation would be equivalent 
to monetary deflation, since in either case adjust-
ment would be promoted solely through the 
creation of a shortage of money. That is why an 
exchange modification is usually accompanied 
by measures that exercise a more direct impact 
on other relative prices. 
Finally, expectations can also frustrate a de-
valuation and make it highly recessive. But these 
expectations should influence the timing and the 
magnitude of a rise in the exchange rate rather 
than the choice between devaluation and mone-
tary deflation. 
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As regards salaries and wages,M the adjust-
ment of the economy to a lower current-account 
deficit, implies that real salaries and wages must 
be affected to the extent that they determine the 
real exchange rate and domestic expenditure, 
for otherwise domestic production will be de-
pressed beneath its potential and/or the growth 
rate of production capacity will be curtailed. 
Increasing the real exchange rate, either in 
the framework of a nominal devaluation or in 
that of a monetary deflation, means reducing the 
costs of production with respect to the prices of 
tradeable goods and services. Although this 
condition puts a ceiling on the nominal increase 
wages and salaries may experience after a de-
valuation (or implies a nominal decrease in wages 
and salaries in the absence of devaluation), it 
does not mean that real salaries and wages must 
necessarily fall in order for the real exchange to 
rise.35 In other words, it is conceivable —though 
not likely— that prevailing circumstances would 
be such that it would be feasible to reduce the 
current-account deficit without reducing real 
34See, for example, Rudiger Dornbusch, Open economy 
macroeconomics (New York, Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 
1980), Part 2; William C. Cline, "Economic stabilization in 
developing countries", op, cit., and Omotunde Johnson and 
Joanne Salop, "Distributional aspects of stabilization pro-
grammes in developing countries", IMF Staff Papers, March 
1980, and Rudiger Dornbusch, "Comments", in John Wil-
liamson, éd., IMF Conditionality, op. cit. 
35Let us suppose that in a small economy both the value 
of the product and the value of consumption are made up 
equally of tradeable goods and services and non-tradeable 
goods and services; that salaries and wages represent on 
average 50% of the costs of production in both sectors; that 
no intermediate goods are imported, and that, in general, 
producers of non-tradeables are incapable of exerting any 
lasting influence on prices. In such circumstances, it is easy to 
show that achieving a real devaluation does not entail de-
creasing the real remuneration of the labour force. For exam-
ple, let us assume that the nominal exchange rate rises by 60% 
and, consequently, that the nominal salaries and wages rise 
by 40%, on average. According to the above assumptions, this 
rise will lead to an average increase of 20% in prices of 
non-tradeables. Real salaries and wages will not have fallen, 
because their nominal increase has fully offset the variation in 
the domestic level of prices: Nonethe less , the 
real exchange rate will have risen by 33.3% (160/120). (Of 
course, during the process of adjusting expenditure and the 
product to the new relative domestic prices, the prices of 
non-tradeables will again rise.) (This example is similar to the 
one given by Cline, op. cit., p. 181.) 
wages and salaries or creating unemployment.36 
In contrast, to be able to reduce domestic 
expenditure with respect to the product without 
jeopardizing the pace of accumulation, it is usual-
ly essential to cut real salaries and wages, since 
otherwise it would not be possible to increase 
domestic savings; in other words, it would not be 
possible to finance the existing level of invest-
ment expenditure.37 
To the extent that it were necessary to dimin-
ish real salaries arid wages to avoid depressing 
the level of activity or sacrificing future growth, 
such a reduction would, according to the ortho-
dox approach, be nothing but the consequence 
of excessive real wage growth in the past or of a 
permanent loss of national income. 
As regards the interest rate,3S in an open econ-
omy with a fixed exchange rate, the monetary 
authority is obliged to adjust the stock of net 
domestic assets in order to satisfy simultaneously 
the public's demand for real balances and its own 
goal for the overall balance of payments. In this 
context, the interest rate becomes endogenous: 
the authority cannot simultaneously control the 
supply of monetary aggregates and the interest 
rate. Moreover, in an economy in which interest-
bearing domestic and external assets are perfect 
substitutes, the domestic interest rate cannot di-
verge permanently from the one prevailing in 
the international market unless the international 
mobility of capital is imperfect. Also, if the econ-
omy is a small one, its interest rate will not affect 
the international rate. 
If the exchange rate is fixed, the domestic 
interest rate can deviate from the external one to 
the extent that there are expectations of a varia-
tion in the exchange rate. Over the long run, 
3 6 To show how difficult it is to maintain the level of 
activity during an adjustment process, it is sufficient to point 
out that, in order to do this, the entire decrease in domestic 
expenditure would have to fall on imports, whereas the de-
crease in investment would have to fall entirely on the growth 
rate of production capacity (and not on its utilization). 
37Nevertheless, this restriction would not necessarily 
operate if the marginal propensity to consume out of income 
from profits and rents ¡n the sector producing tradeable 
goods and services were lower than that prevailing in the 
sector producing non-tradeables, or if the efficiency of in-
vestment could be increased. 
38See, for example, William H. Branson, "Economic 
structure and policy for external balance", op. cit. 
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however, the real domestic rate would still reflect 
the real rate on the international market. If the 
exchange rate is totally flexible, the authority 
can, in principle, choose between managing the 
money supply and controlling the interest rate. 
In this case, however, the need for an adjustment 
would not arise, since the total flexibility of the 
exchange rate implies a balance-of-payments 
position that is always equal to zero. Consequent-
ly, the only case which concerns us for purposes 
of establishing an interest-rate policy relating to 
adjustment is the one in which the exchange rate 
is not entirely flexible.39 
In this context, the policy should be aimed at 
not hindering the spontaneous behaviour of the 
interest rate; otherwise the role it should play in 
achieving adjustment may be undermined. Let 
us assume that the adjustment programme cre-
ates a money shortage, whether through mone-
tary deflation or through devaluation. The coun-
terpart to excess demand on the monetary mar-
ket is excess supply on the markets for goods and 
assets and it is precisely through the resolution of 
these disequilibria that the balance of payments is 
to be improved. In order to restore equilibrium 
on the monetary market, it is necessary to raise 
the interest rate so as to bring about a net inflow 
of external assets. Under such circumstances, the 
establishment of an interest rate lower than that 
required for balance means inverting the process 
of monetary deflation (or exchange devaluation) 
and weakening or eliminating the incentive to 
the net inflow of capital. On the other hand, if a 
rate higher than the market rate is established, 
the level of activity and the growth of production 
capacity will be sacrificed unnecessarily. 
iii) Implementation of the Fund's adjust-
ment programmes in Latin America 
As regards the policy mix —performance 
criteria, pre-conditions and policy understand-
ings— employed in the IMF adjustment pro-
grammes in force in Latin American and Carib-
bean countries at the end of 1983, it should be 
noted that all of them —Stand-by arrangements 
or Extended Fund Facility loans— are almost the 
:,1
'A flexible exchange rate could be stabilized, but in that 
case the situation would again be one in which the exchange 
rate was fixed or not entirely flexible. 
same. As regards performance criteria, there is 
hardly any difference among the 17 adjustment 
programmes except for the fact that when the 
relevant agreements entered into force, some 
countries had accumulated arrears and others 
had not (see table 3).40 It is noteworthy that all of 
the programmes establish ceilings on the net 
domestic assets of the Central Bank (and not of 
the overall banking system),41 and that none of 
them has a performance criterion relating to the 
deficit of the public sector. 
The first similarity is rather surprising, since 
it is difficult to believe that the monetary multi-
plier is more stable than the demand for money 
in every one of those countries. A priori no defi-
nite conclusion can be reached in this respect. 
Empirically, the results are also contradictory.A'z 
However, such a situation would appear to be the 
only theoretical justification for the fact that this 
same performance criterion is the same in all 17 
adjustment programmes.43 
The second similarity is surprising because it 
is in no way obvious that all the countries in 
question lack capital markets outside the banking 
system.44 On the contrary, there are considerable 
40Table 3 does not include the performance criterion 
—included in all the agreements— which precludes the ap-
plication of measures that would restrict the international 
trade of goods, services and capital. 
4 l I n two countries (Brazil and Peru), performance 
criteria pertaining to monetary aggregates include, in addi-
tion to the Central Bank's balance, the balances of other State 
banks which act as monetary authorities. 
42See William Fellner, "Criteria for useful targeting: 
money versus the base and other variables", Current Issues in 
the Conduct of US Monetary Policy, A conference sponsored by the 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 4-5 
February 1982, Washington D.C.. published in Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. xiv, No. 4, part 2 (November 
1982). 
' Actually, there are other alternatives (bank reserves or 
the discount rate, for example) to using the supply of net 
domestic assets as the operational variable for purposes of 
monetary programming. It has even been shown that there is 
no ideal way to manage the means of payment, i.e., no par-
ticular approach produces the best results in any given dis-
turbance of the monetary market. In the light of these consid-
erations, the aforementioned uniformity appears even more 
questionable. See Ralf C. Bryant, "Federal reserve control of 
the monetary stock", Current Issues in the Conduct of U.S. Mone-
tary Policy, op. cit. 
4 4 l t may also be surprising because it is generally be-
lieved that the public-sector deficit is one of the performance 
criteria of the Fund's programmes. 
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differences among them as regards the volume 
of financial intermediation conducted outside 
banks. This uniform treatment likewise, there-
fore, seems neither to issue unequivocally from 
the theory on which the Fund's adjustment pro-
grammes are based nor to be congruent with the 
objective conditions prevailing in the region. 
Whatever may be the ultimate significance of 
these two apparent anomalies, a question arises 
as to the consistency between the content of the 
Fund's actual adjustment programmes and its 
underlying theoretical approach. 
As far as policy understandings are con-
cerned, the adjustment programmes also show a 
high degree of uniformity (see table 3).45 This in 
itself is not so significant; what is more important 
is the magnitudes involved, i.e., how much the 
exchange rate had to be raised, to what extent it 
was decided to increase the government's cur-
rent income, etc. Nonetheless, there are four 
points that should be mentioned. In the first 
place, this section of table 3 is enlightening be-
cause of what it omits. Indeed, whereas salaries, 
and wages and real expenditures of the public 
sector are explicitly or implicitly restricted, and 
other key prices, such as those of public services 
and the exchange rate, are increased in real 
terms, there is no policy whatsoever that is aimed 
at conditioning the level of prices of goods and 
services in the private sector. 
This asymmetry could make it difficult to 
obtain the conditions needed so that a restriction 
on the growth of money with respect to prevail-
ing inflation —monetary deflation— may lead to 
a deceleration of inflation and an improvement 
of the external position rather than to a fall in the 
level of activity. If inflationary expectations are 
guided by past inflation, or, what would be worse 
but even more likely, by real rises in the exchange 
rate, in prices of public services and in taxes, over 
the short term a restriction in the growth of the 
means of payment would depress the domestic 
p r o d u c t w i t h o u t c h e c k i n g i n f l a t i o n o r 
strengthening the balance of payments.46 In 
4 5It should be noted that it was not possible to establish 
with any degree of certainty the existence of pre-conditions to 
the agreements considered here. 
short, some measure or measures have to be 
taken to bring inflationary expectations in line 
with the restrictions on the remuneration of the 
labour force and the creation of money.47 
On the other hand in the adjustment agree-
ments one notes a certain disaggregation of vari-
ables, a characteristic which was noteworthy for 
its absence in the Fund's programmes in the past. 
Indeed, these agreements do not dwell exclusive-
ly on the most highly aggregated variables such 
as the public-sector deficit; rather, they include 
measures pertaining to current income, certain 
taxes, current expenditures and capital outlays. 
Some of the programmes provide for increasing 
capital expenditures in real terms and decreasing 
current expenditures (see table 3). 
It would be reasonable to think that this 
apparent trend towards more detailed policy 
understandings was the result of a concern for 
the structural aspect (the supply side) of the 
adjustment process. However, there is no evi-
dence, from the available information, that the 
long-term adjustment programmes (EFF) provide 
for a more detailed set of measures than the 
short-term adjustment programmes (SBA). This 
4bIt would be enough for only one price to be inflexible 
to create conditions in which the product and employment, 
and not only the level of prices and external accounts, would 
fluctuate whenever there was a shock such as monetary defla-
tion. And even if it were possible for all prices to adjust 
immediately, this would not be enough to prevent shocks 
from affecting the level of activity. Indeed, such immunity 
would also require instantaneous adjustments of expendi-
ture, of the factors of production, and of capital movements 
to the new system of relative prices in the necessary directions 
and magnitudes. On the first point, see E. Malinvaud, The 
Theory of Unemployment Reconsidered (London, 1977); G. 
Muellbaur and R. Portes, "Macroeconomic models with 
quantity rationing", The Economic Journal, Vol. 88, No. 352 
(December 1978); and William H. Branson, "Economic struc-
ture and policy for external balance", op. cit. On the second 
aspect, see, for example, Richard Lynn Ground, "El enfoque 
ortodoxo de ajuste: una exposición, una critica y la bús-
queda de alternativas," ECLAC Santiago, Chile, Economie De-
velopment Division, April 1984 (mimeographed). 
4 7 The problem of the inconsistencies of economic poli-
cies in Latin American adjustment programmes is discussed 
by Ramos, op. cit., chapter 6, and by ECLAC, op. cit., 1984. See 
also Jorge Marshall, José Luis Mardones and Isabel Marshall, 
"IMF conditionally: the experiences of Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile", in Williamson, op. cit., 1983. 
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is also noteworthy, since one might expect to see 
some difference between short- and long-term 
adjustment programmes, if only because the 
Fund itself has made statements to this effect in 
its documents.48 
Finally, it should be noted that although re-
duction of the public-sector deficit is not a per-
formance criterion, it figures, as a major policy 
understanding in all the agreements (see table 3). 
b) The nature of the targets 
i) Conceptual aspects. 
There are two aspects to the selection of 
targets in the formulation of economic policy: 
the selection of variables whose values are to be 
conditioned (i.e., target-variables) and the choice 
of the type of target proper. From the conceptual 
standpoint, target-variables may be divided into 
ultimate, intermediate and operational ones.49 
Ultimate targets are set for those macroeconomic 
variables, such as the level of activity, employ-
ment, prices and the balance of payments, which 
are or which reflect —in the absence of other 
short-term indicators— the ultimate objectives of 
economic policy, such as well-being and self-
reliance. Intermediate targets are set for vari-
ables, such as the money supply and the real 
exchange rate, with which the ultimate target-
variables are most closely associated but which 
the authority cannot control, either directly or 
entirely, within the relevant time span. Oper-
ational target-variables are variables which can 
be used by the authority to influence intermedi-
ate target-variables and, through them, hopeful-
ly influence the ultimate target-variables in the 
direction and to the degree desired. These are 
variables, such as the Central Bank's stock of net 
domestic assets and the exchange rate, over 
which the authority is able to exercise more direct 
and close —though not necessarily total— con-
trol. 
48See Guitián, op. cit., 1980 and op. cit., 1982. 
49See, for example, Benjamin Friedman, "Targets, in-
struments, and indicators of monetary policy", Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Vol. 1, No. 2 (October 1975); and Gorden 
H. Sellon Jr . and Ronald L. Teigan, "The choice of short-run 
targets for monetary policy", Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City Economic Review, April 1981. 
The types of targets themselves may also be 
differentiated according to the degree of control 
they imply on the part of the authority, as fol-
lows: specific, average, ranges and fixed or flexi-
ble. We will come back to this aspect later on in 
the article. 
ii) Targets established in the Fund's 
adjustment programmes in 
Latin America 
—Classification and calculation of targets. As a 
general rule, the Fund sets the targets envisaged 
in its adjustment programmes for the last day of 
each quarter of the year following the entry into 
force of the agreement; in other words, it tends 
to use specific short-term targets. This is the na-
ture of the most important targets, i.e., those 
which involve performance criteria.50 For the 
sake of simplicity, however, we have calculated 
the targets on a 12-month basis, beginning 
(approximately) on the date of signature of each 
agreement (see table 4).51 Unless otherwise indi-
cated, targets which are expressed as growth 
rates refer to variations between the date on 
which the agreement in question was signed and 
the end of the following 12-month period. These 
dates appear in the first column of table 4. 
The ultimate targets for which we were able 
to obtain data or effect indirectly estimates 
appear in the second and third columns of the 
table; these refer to the overall balance-of-
payments position —the variation in net external 
assets of the ,monetary authority— and 
inflation.32 The data for those targets were taken 
from the adjustment agreements; on the other 
hand, targets for inflation were derived from a 
comparison between targets for the growth of 
the supply of money (discussed below) and infla-
tion rates prevailing at the time the agreements 
in question were signed. Targets for inflation 
5 0 l t should be remembered that these targets are ex-
pressed as ceilings (in the case, for example, of the stock of net 
domestic assets) or floors (in the case, for example, of the 
stock of net external assets). 
51
 In practice, we took the last target an compared it with 
the actual magnitude of the variable concerned 12 months 
before. 
No data were available for current-account targets or 
—if they existed— for the level of activity. 
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show how much the existing rate of inflation 
would have to fall in order to maintain the money 
supply constant in real terms, from the beginning 
to the end of the period considered, given the 
target for that variable. By following the same 
line of reasoning, one can calculate the degree of 
monetary deflation that is implicit in the agree-
ments; this indicates the degree to which there 
would be a real contraction in the programmed 
supply of money if the prevailing rate of inflation 
remained constant. The first figure in column 3 
is the implicit target for inflation and the second 
one is the implicit degree of monetary deflation. 
The fourth to the sixth columns of table 4 
show the intermediate target-variables; the rela-
tive price system, represented by the actual trend 
followed by the real rate of exchange, and money 
(Mi and M2). The targets for M[ and M2 are 
implicit and were derived from the targets for 
the monetary base and projections of the mone-
tary multipliers.53 Alternatively, targets could 
have been derived for the net domestic assets of 
the banking system.54 
Operational targets are shown in the seventh 
and eighth columns.55 Data for the monetary 
base were obtained directly from the perfor-
mance criteria, i.e., directly from the sum of the 
values of the targets for the stock of net domestic 
53A very simple formula was used to project the mone-
tary multipliers: an average of the average value observed in 
the five years prior to the agreement, of the value observed ¡n 
the year prior to the agreement, and of the value which would 
have resulted if the trend observed between the penultimate 
and the last year prior to the entry into force of the adjust-
ment programme had continued. There does not seem to be 
any reason for believing that this formula is any worse (or 
better) than any other, including those used by the Fund to 
calculate monetary multipliers, but we do not claim to have 
reproduced the calculations made by the Fund. These statis-
tics are presented purely for purposes of illustration. 
r>4Indeed, that procedure would more faithfully repre-
sent the Fund's monetary programming exercises, since the 
monetary aggregates that have to be adjusted in order to 
reconcile the public's demand for money with the target for 
the balance of payments is the stock of net domestic assets. 
However, our purpose was rather to show the degree of 
restriction that the agreements would imply if all the targets 
for monetary aggregates were met. Hence, the best measure 
to use is the implicit target for money. 
5 5No information was available on targets for the 
nominal exchange rate. 
assets and the stock of net external assets of the 
monetary authority.56 The targets for public-
sector indebtedness were also taken directly from 
the agreements. 
The last two columns show the targets for the 
deficit of the non-financial public sector and its 
utilization of bank credit. These have been called 
policy instruments (as they relate to the manage-
ment of the net domestic assets of the monetary 
authority).57 
—The data. With respect to the ultimate 
targets, there are considerable differences in the 
ones concerning the variations in the monetary 
authority's holdings of net external assets. In-
deed, some of the agreements provide for an 
increase; others propose that this stock be main-
tained constant or almost constant, and still 
others envisage a decrease, sometimes a very 
sharp one (see table 4). From this standpoint, the 
adjustment programmes do not appear to be 
very restrictive. However, such a judgement can-
not be made without reference to the targets for 
the current account and the value of the gross 
domestic product. 
With regard to the targets for inflation, as 
might be expected in the orthodox approach to 
adjustment, some degree of monetary deflation 
is implicit in all those agreements for which basic 
information was available, except the second 
year of the Jamaican EFF. In other words, at pre-
vailing inflation rates, the targets for the varia-
tion of M i assumed (or assume) real reduction in 
the stock of means of payment in all the countries 
in question. The proportion fluctuated between 
5% for Jamaica (in the first year of its EFF) and 
45% for Costa Rica. It was between 9% and 16% 
for Ecuador, Peru and Argentina, 22% and 23% 
for Brazil and over 29% for Chile. Translated 
into targets for reducing inflation —i.e., inflation 
rates consistent with the maintenance of the 
5Gln setting targets for both sources of the monetary 
base, the Fund in effect establishes a target for the monetary 
base. However, in the Fund's scheme, the operational target-
variable is the monetary authority's stock of net domestic 
assets. On this question, see note 54. 
57It might be more appropriate to treat them as oper-
ational target-variables (linked with the achievement of 
targets for the sectoral allocation of credit and the composi-
tion of domestic expenditure). However, this is a secondary 
question and it is not necessary to go into it here. 
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money stock in real terms—, the figures varied 
between -22% for Peru (from 73% to 57%) and 
over -100% for Chile (from 22% to -14%). For 
Argentina (from 221% to 170%), Ecuador (from 
57% to 41%), and Jamaica (from 19% to 13% in 
the first year of the agreement), they fluctuated 
between - 2 3 % and -33%. For Brazil, the figure 
was - 4 3 % (from 105% to 60%) in the first agree-
ment and -44% (from 104% to 58%) in the 
second; and for Costa Rica, the implicit target for 
reducing inflation was -95% (from 92% to 5%). 
On the other hand, in the second year of the 
Jamaican agreement, the implicit target for ex-
panding Mi was way over the inflation prevailing 
at the time (see table 4). 
Although one observes monetary policies 
that are generally quite restrictive and, in several 
cases, targets that imply drastic reductions in in-
flation, it would appear from the targets for 
monetary aggregates that the inflation the Fund 
is willing to "live with" can be very high. Indeed, 
in one case (Argentina), the implicit target for the 
growth of Mi was 170%. One does not have to be 
a monetarist to recognize that with such a high 
rate of growth of the means of payment, inflation 
has to be very high. At the same time, these 
targets reveal clear differences among adjust-
ment programmes. For example, under the 
programme for Costa Rica, the target for the 
growth of M i was 5 % while the prevailing rate of 
inflation was 82%; under the programme For 
, Peru, the implicit target for Mi was 57% when 
inflation was 72%. 
Finally, with respect to this question, it 
should be noted that if inflation were to rise 
instead of falling —and this did happen, for ex-
ample, in Argentina, Brazil and Jamaica— the 
degree of monetary deflation would have inten-
sified concomitantly, with the consequent nega-
tive effect on the level of activity, unless the sup-
ply of money were expanded more than antici-
pated —and this also happened in several of the 
same countries. 
On the other hand, to the extent that mone-
tary deflation translates into the intended decel-
eration of inflation, the real value of the money 
stock, and hence the level of activity, is un-
affected. In this regard, it is worth mentioning 
the Costa Rican experience, where inflation de-
celerated markedly in the months following the 
implementation of the adjustment programme. 
Also, the extent of monetary deflation would be 
lessened in so far as it were possible for monetary 
growth to exceed the target without accelerating 
inflation. Such was the Chilean experience, 
where Mi rose instead of falling, while inflation 
remained more or less constant. 
With regard to the behaviour of the other 
intermediate target, which refers to the system of 
relative prices and is very imperfectly repre-
sented here by the real ex post exchange rate, the 
figures also vary greatly, as might be expected in 
light of the range of objective conditions prevail-
ing in the economies of the countries under con-
siderations. In six of the 15 countries for which 
we were able to calculate it for the period in 
question, the real exchange rate rose; in five, it 
remained more or less constant, and in four, it 
declined. Among the countries in which it was 
relatively stable, in one (Argentina), it had 
already risen sharply in preceding years, and in 
one (Costa Rica) in which it fell, it had also risen 
markedly in preceding years. 
In more than half the countries considered, 
the real exchange rate was much higher in 1983 
than it had been in the early 1980s; in some of 
them —especially the larger countries— it was 
very much higher. Nonetheless, it does not seem 
correct to argue, as some do, that through its 
adjustment programmes, the Fund has encour-
aged the region to "force" its exports, i.e., to 
increase them beyond the volume that could be 
absorbed by the international economy without a 
drop in prices. On the other hand, this argument 
cannot be discarded out of hand without know-
ing what the pre-conditions to the agreements 
were. In any event, there has in fact been a 
dramatic readjustment of relative prices in the 
regional economy over the last three years: if we 
add the economies of Argentina (where the ex-
change rate rose by 91%), Brazil (18%), Chile 
(38%), Mexico (52%) and Peru (32%), we get 
80% of the regional gross domestic product. 
It should also be noted that there is no con-
sistency in the relationship between the magni-
tude of the variation in the real exchange rate 
and the degree of monetary deflation. Contrary 
to what might be expected, there ís not an inverse 
relationship between the stringency of monetary 
deflation and the variation in the exchange rate. 
However, this apparent irregularity could easily 
be explained by the fact that the data on the 
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exchange rate do not refer to the targets but 
rather to the rates actually obtained. 
With respect to the operational targets, we 
have already mentioned the targets for the 
monetary base in the context of the discussion on 
monetary policy. In that regard, we pointed out 
how widely the targets varied, as well as the con-
siderable growth that was envisaged in some 
agreements. The targets for the growth of exter-
nal indebtedness of the public sector, on the 
other hand, are relatively uniform: between 
7.5% and 11% in every case for which informa-
tion is available except Costa Rica, which had one 
of 3%. 
The targets for the deficit spending of the 
non-financial public sector are also quite similar. 
Thus, one might say that there is a rule of thumb 
according to which this deficit should be reduced 
by approximately one half in a one-year period. 
The only countries that depart from this norm 
are Uruguay, for which much sharper reductions 
were set, and Brazil, whose third agreement with 
the Fund, signed in 1983, provides for a new 
target that would mean just barely reducing the 
deficit. In the latter case, this was clearly a matter 
of simply acknowledging a fait accompli. 
Although in many countries the deficit of the 
non-financial public sector rose in 1981-1982 
(and also in 1983) as a direct result of the fall in 
the level of economic activity, which suggests that 
the deterioration of external accounts could 
hardly be attributed in every case to excess de-
mand, it is no less true that, once an external 
bottleneck prevails —when it becomes impossible 
to increase the volume of imports— the expan-
sion of the deficit tends to lead to inflation rather 
than to an increase in output. And when the 
volume of imports has to be reduced, it is almost 
inevitable that an increase in the public-sector 
deficit will lead to inflation. Here one has the 
aberrant situation wherein inflation (even hyper-
inflation) concurs with recession (even depres-
sion). In other words, whereas at full employ-
ment the present public-sector budget would 
presumably even show surpluses in several coun-
tries, this does not necessarily mean that a greater 
deficit would in practice amount to a countercy-
clical policy. When output growth is externally 
constrained one can justify reducing the deficit 
even if the economy is in recession —which is not 
to say that such a policy could be carried out at no 
cost. Nor does it mean that the observed uni-
formity of treatment given to the countries as 
regards the targets for the public-sector deficit is 
consistent with the objective possibilities and 
needs of each one of them. 
Like the other monetary targets, the ones for 
net domestic bank financing of the public sector 
show different degrees of restrictiveness. What is 
more, there does not seem to.be a general rule 
that credit to the public sector is to be restricted 
more than credit to the private sector, as might 
have been expected. On the contrary, given the 
monetary multipliers for M2, it is evident from 
the relationships between the targets for the 
monetary base and the targets for net domestic 
credit to the public sector that in most cases for 
which data are available, the greatest restriction 
affects the allocation of credit to the private sec-
tor (see table 4). 
In summary, as recently applied in Latin 
America the approach observed may be de-
scribed in broad terms as one which is almost 
always very restrictive as regards monetary and 
fiscal policies and is often very aggressive as re-
gards exchange-rate policy. Such policy thrusts 
are perfectly consistent with the underlying 
model and with the need to reduce the current-
account deficit. And although there is a certain 
rigidity or uniformity in the policy mix —or, if 
one wishes, a qualitative uniformity— one cannot 
argue, on the basis of the figures examined here, 
that in applying its policies, the Fund completely 
disregards the variety of objective conditions 
obtaining in each country. 
The question that one would like to answer at 
this point is whether the Fund's adjustment poli-
cies have —considering the magnitudes and 
directions involved— a recessive bias. If one re-
lies exclusively on the figures examined here, 
one does not at first sight notice in most of the 
agreements anything that might cause such a 
bias, with the possible exception of the credit 
policy, which —contrary to all expectations— 
seems to have been more stringent with regard to 
the private sector than to the public sector. On 
the other hand, in at least two countries (Costa 
Rica and Chile) and perhaps in a third one (Bra-
zil, in its first two agreements), the extreme re-
strictiveness of monetary policy would appear at 
first sight to show evidence of such a bias. Strictly 
speaking, however, one cannot give a categorical 
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answer to this question, in either these two or 
three cases or the remaining ones, without scruti-
nizing additional information. For example, to 
what extent does inflation reflect the inertia of 
the economic system? In a country such as Costa 
Rica, whic does not have a recent history of infla-
tion, a decidedly anti-inflationary policy can be 
much less recessive than in a country such as 
Argentina, in which the very impetus of inflation 
can cause a monetary policy that is only mod-
erately restrictive to lead to a profound reces-
sion.50 
2. A critique of conditionality 
The nature of conditionality gives rise to at least 
four controversial questions; these pertain to 
the reasoning behind the application of mone-
tary performance criteria, the choice of the 
monetary aggregates used as performance 
criteria, the choice of the most adequate régime 
for monetary programming and the nature of 
the targets. 
To question the rationale behind the use of 
monetary performance criteria is to question the 
validity of the very essence of the monetarist 
interpretation according to which the direction 
of causality leads from money to the value of 
production and the balance of payments. We 
shall not explore in depth the essence of this 
perennial controversy;60 rather, we shall consid-
58It should be remembered, however, that the Fund's 
adjustment programmes' policy mix does lead to a recessive 
bias. 
5 9We will not touch on the question whether the Fund's 
financing should or should not be subject to conditions. 
60See, for example, Don Patinkin, Money Interest and 
Prices, Harper and Row, New York, 1965; Milton Friedman, 
"A theoretical framework for monetary analysis", Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 78, No. 2, March/April 1970; Harry G. 
Johnson, "The Keynesian revolution and the monetarist 
counter-revolution", The American Economic Review, Vol. LXI, 
No. 2, May 1971;RJ. Gordon (éd.), Milton Friedman's Monetary 
Framework: A Debate with his critics, Chicago, 1974; Peter Ten-
nin, Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression?, W.W. 
Norton and Company, New York, 1976; Robert J. Barro, 
"Unanticipated money, output and the price level in the 
United States", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 86, August 
1978; and James Tobin, "The monetarist counter-revolution 
today: an appraisal", The Economic Journal, Vol. 91 , March 
1981. 
er only a few of the weaknesses of the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments.61 
In short, we do not aspire to reach any par-
ticular conclusions as to the principle of using 
monetary performance criteria, but rather to 
show that the formal apparatus of the Fund does 
not produce results as automatic and precise as 
claimed.62 To this end, we will look at the issues 
of the choice of the monetary aggregates to be 
used as performance criteria and the choice of 
the types of targets to be employed. 
a) .Some fallacies of the monetary approach 
to the balance of payments 
The monetary approach to the balance of 
payments, which is the foundation of the Fund's 
adjustment programmes and particularly of its 
conditionality policy, has a serious flaw, namely, 
the identification of a balance-of-payments de-
ficit (surplus) with an excess supply (shortage) of 
money. 
The fallacy of this reasoning may be illus-
trated by analysing situations in which this identi-
ty is not valid.63 Let us assume, for example, that 
an economy is simultaneously experiencing both 
a recession and a balance-of-payments deficit. 
The concurrent disequilibria in the domestic and 
foreign sectors may have been caused by a sharp 
drop in external demand for its exports which 
reduced pari passu, its income and its money 
stock. In such a situation —one characteristic of 
many countries of the region in recent years—, 
would it be right to identify the balance-of-
payments deficit with an excess supply of money? 
Should the money supply be reduced even fur-
ther in order to reverse the external disequi-
librium? 
Let us assume, on the other hand, that an 
6 ,See, for example, John Williamson, "The lending poli-
cies of the International Monetary Fund", in Williamson, op. 
cit. 
6 2Nor will we deal here therefore, with the controversy 
regarding the selection of the best operating régime for 
monetary programming. See footnote 43 above. 
6 SThis presentation follows that of Alan B. Rabin and 
Leland B. Yaeger, "Monetary approaches to the balances of 
payments and exchange rates", Essays in International Finance, 
No. 148, Princeton University, Department of Economics, 
International Finance Section, November 1982. 
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international inflation leads to a balance-of-
payments surplus and domestic price inflation. 
From the monetarist point of view, inflation is 
associated with an excess supply of money, but in 
the monetary approach to the balance of pay-
ments an overall balance-of-payments surplus is 
equated with an excess demand for money, i.e., 
insufficient stock of money. Monetarist criteria 
lead to contradictory results not only because 
they do not take external conditions into account, 
but also because they tend, in one way or another, 
to overlook the existence of goods, services, fac-
tors and assets that are not internationally 
traded. Indeed, a surfeit (dearth) of money with 
respect to demand could be the counterpart to 
—or imply— a shortage (a surplus) on the mar-
kets for goods, services, factors and assets that 
are only domestically traded. When such markets 
do exist, a balance-of-payments deficit (surplus) 
may even coexist with an excess demand for (ex-
cess supply of) money. 
However, even if all domestic and foreign 
goods, services, factors and assets were, as is 
usually assumed, perfect substitutes, a shortage 
(surplus) of means of payment could lead both to 
a decrease (increase) in the level of activity and to 
a balance-of-payments surplus (deficit). The 
monetary approach breaks the link between the 
supply of and demand for money and the level of 
activity by assuming that the economy is always 
in a full-employment situation; or alternatively, 
that over the short run, the level of activity is 
fixed. However, as has been noted more than 
once, these assumptions "solve" conflicts by eli-
minating alternatives. 
The other main proposition of the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments is that the 
monetary authori ty cannot compensate for 
("sterilize") the monetary impact of balance-of-
payments outcomes. This idea is derived directly 
from the notion that the overall balance of for-
eign transactions is nothing but a reflection of the 
relationship between domestic money creation 
and domestic demand for money. Indeed, if 
domestic monetary demand determines the 
stock of means of payment that circulates in the 
economy, in static equilibrium any increase (de-
crease) in the supply of net domestic assets would 
be reflected in an equivalent loss (gain) in net 
external assets; in other words, in a deficit (sur-
plus) in the global balance of payments rather 
than in an increase (decrease) in the money stock. 
This proposition, however, is also erroneous. 
Let as assume that an increase in international 
interest rates produces a deficit in the balance of 
payments. The stock of means of payment will, of 
course, simultaneously contract. At the prevail-
ing level of demand for money this will produce 
an imbalance in the monetary market. Given the 
level of activity, the disequilibrium can only be 
resolved by reversing the outflow of external 
assets —i.e., achieving a surplus on the balance of 
payments— or by increasing the supply of net 
domestic assets. This latter option, however, is in 
fact, precisely a "sterilization" operation. Again, 
the fallacy of the monetary approach lies in the 
incongruity of its basic underlying assump-
tions.64 
Although the aforementioned fallacies do 
not invalidate the use of monetary performance 
criteria, their contemplation constitutes a point 
of departure for questioning the nature of the 
Fund's conditionality policy. Indeed, if the 
monetary approach does not in fact lead to 
mechanical or precise conclusions, first of all a 
question arises as to whether the Fund's per-
formance criteria are consistent with the com-
mon-sense logic of the multi-stage approach to 
targeting. At issue is whether the variables which 
the Fund uses as performance criteria do or do 
not possess the characteristics of operational 
variables; in other words, the question is whether 
they are variables that are in fact subject to con-
trol by the economic policy-makers. The answer 
is unequivocal. The policy-makers cannot exer-
6 4For further comments on these points and a discus-
sion on other sources of error in the monetary approach to 
the balance of payments, see also Marina Whitman, "Global 
monetarism and the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments". Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, No. 3, 1975; 
Frank H. Hann, "The monetary approach to the balance of 
payments", Journal of International Economics, Vol. 7, No. 3, 
August 1977; Blackwell, op. cit., 1977; Mordechai E. Krenin 
and Laurence H. Officer, "The monetary approach to the 
balance of payments : a survey", Princeton Studies on 
International Finance, No. 43, Princeton University, Depart-
ment of Economics, International Finance Section, Novem-
ber 1978; Branson, op. cit., 1983; and Charles Collyns, "On 
the monetary analysis of an open economy", IMF Staff Papers, 
Vol. 30, No. 2, June 1983. 
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cise a reasonable degree of control, much less 
close control, over the stock of net external assets. 
Consequently, this variable cannot and should 
not be treated as if it were an operational variable 
as the Fund does in using it as a performance 
criterion. 
If the manipulation of the stock of net 
domestic assets does not produce equivalent 
variations in the overall balance-of-payments 
position, the incongruency is evident. It becomes 
even more obvious when one considers that the 
balance of payments is conditioned by factors 
which are entirely beyond the sphere of influ-
ence of the policy-makers, e.g., the external de-
mand for goods and services, the world supply of 
and demand for goods and services that the 
country imports and international interest rates. 
Indeed, any variation in these external factors 
would divert the overall balance-of-payments 
position from its target , independent ly of 
whether or not the authority had met the other 
performance criteria.65 
It is conceivable, of course, that policy-
makers might be able to compensate for unfore-
seen variations in external conditions, but they 
would only be able to achieve the targets for the 
stock of net external assets if they had an unli-
mited capacity to act and produce immediate and 
precise compensatory effects. Such a feat is im-
plausible, however, since the manipulation of 
operational variables does not produce automa-
tic or precise results.66 
It is inappropriate to hold policy-makers re-
sponsible for the behaviour of a variable, such as 
the overall balance-of-payments position, which 
is not subject to its control. It makes even less 
sense for any deviation from the target for the 
stock of net external assets to automatically trig-
ger the suspension of disbursements of Fund 
financing. This is, however, the situation. There 
is no justification for this policy, which intro-
, ,5This point was brought out at a recent conference on 
Fund policies. See Carlos Días-Alejandro, "Comments", and 
Richard N. Cooper, "Panel discussion", in Williamson, op. cit., 
1983. 
•"•The only way such a capacity might conceivably exist 
would be under a totally flexible exchange rate régime. 
However, the Fund's approach rests on the assumption that 
the exchange rate is fixed, or at least not entirely flexible. 
duces a notorious recessionary bias in the Fund's 
adjustment programmes and should be elimi-
nated. 
T h e other performance criterion which 
seems defective is the one which restricts the 
external indebtedness of the public sector. We do 
not question the idea that the expansion of exter-
nal indebtedness should be compatible with the 
target for the composition of the balance of pay-
ments as between the current and the capital 
account balances. Nor are we unaware of the fact 
that the restriction of public-sector indebtedness 
could be used as a way of holding back the growth 
of overall external indebtedness. The problem 
with this policy lies in the fact that the interna-
tional financial community is not prepared 
to lend money to the private sector of economies 
which confront problems with the service of their 
external debts and adjustment processes; rather, 
if they provide any financing at all, they will do so 
only to the public sector. The contradiction be-
tween this reality and the performance criterion 
in question is evident. 
b) What type of targets? 
i) The dilemma of fixed specific targets 
In the monetarist paradigm, it is assumed 
that the creation of the supply of means of pay-
ment is an exogenous process, i.e., that neither 
the non-banking public nor the financial inter-
mediaries play any part in generating the supply 
of money. Under this approach to the monetary 
market, the banking sector does not exist and the 
public only intervenes with its demand for real 
balances. In a closed economy (or one with a fully 
flexible exchange rate), this demand determines 
the value of the means of payment which the 
monetary authority has elected to supply. In an 
open economy with a fixed exchange rate, or an 
exchange rate that is not entirely flexible, the 
process of reconciling the public's demand for 
real balances with the supply of means of pay-
ment can affect both the level of prices and the 
supply of means of payment that actually circu-
late in the economy. In either case, it is assumed 
that the monetary authority alone determines 
the supply of means of payment and hence, that 
it does so in a precise and continuous fashion. 
Here we have, it seems, the origin of the use of 
specific targets —i.e., targets referring to varia-
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tions from one date to another— for monetary 
aggregates. In any event, this is the type of target 
which the International Monetary Fund uses for 
its performance criteria. 
A growing outcry against this Fund policy is 
issuing from a heterogeneous group of experts 
including Dragoslav Avramovic, Richard N. 
Cooper, Sidney Dell, Arnold C. Harberger, G.K. 
Helleiner and John Williamson.67 Their opposi-
tion to this procedure is based on both the the-
oretical proposition and the observed reality that 
it is impossible to exercise the close control over 
monetary aggregates that would be required to 
meet such targets. Contrary to the monetarist 
assumption, not all the factors that determine the 
money supply are subject to control by policy-
makers. Indeed, the monetary authority is ca-
pable of exercising precise and discretionary con-
trol over only one of the factors that determine 
the supply of money, i.e., the required reserve 
ratio. Of the other four factors, three are beyond 
any direct Central Bank control. The non-
banking public chooses the composition of its 
financial portfolio as between cash holdings and 
deposits, and the distribution of its deposits as 
between monetary and financial ones, while the 
commercial banks and similar institutions estab-
lish the relationship between their excess re-
serves and their liabilities. Like the money sup-
ply, the other determinant —the monetary ba-
se— is the product of decisions taken simul-
taneously by different agents —the monetary au-
thority, the non-banking public, the commercial 
banks and the non-financial public sector. In 
short, the supply of money is endogenous, not 
exogenous. 
Of the factors of expansion and contraction 
of the monetary base, the ones that the Central 
Bank can always manipulate at its discretion in-
clude the allocation of credit to the non-financial 
private sector and its own external liabilities (as 
f,7See, for example, Dragoslav Avramovic, "Role of the 
International Monetary Fund. The disputes, qualifications 
and future"; Richard N. Cooper et ai, "Conclusions and 
policy implications", and Sidney Dell, "Stabilization: the polit-
ical economy of overkill", in John Williamson, op. cit., 1983; 
G.K. Helleiner, op. cit., 1983, and "Lender of early resort: the 
IMF and the poorest", American Economic Review, Vol. 73, 
No. 2, May 1983. 
well as several other liabilities and assets, includ-
ing the capital accounts). It can also decide how 
much credit to grant to the non-financial public 
sector if it is institutionally independent; how 
much to grant to the private financial sector if 
there is no run on the banks; and, in principle, it 
can also determine its holdings of external assets 
if it is willing to allow the exchange rate to fluctu-
ate freely. On the other hand, it cannot pro-
gramme the governments' deposits or the vari-
ation of its assets and liabilities arising from the 
liquidation of interbank accounts (see table 5).(>H 
In the light of these considerations, there is 
also good reason to question the assumption that 
the monetary authority can accurately determine 
the monetary base or even the supply of net 
domestic assets, since the capacity to do this also 
depends on a series of factors over which the 
authority has no discretionary control or no con-
trol at all (see table 5). 
Now, it is true that the monetary authority 
could in principle control any monetary aggre-
gate, even if some of the determinants thereof 
were beyond its control, provided it could predict 
their future trends. However, the expectation or 
hope that the authority might be able to achieve 
this as a routine matter has been frustrated, as is 
shown by the performance of the various de-
veloped countries that have tried to implement 
monetary rules —i.e., that have tried to pro-
gramme the growth of a given monetary aggre-
gate at a given rate. Indeed, not one of these 
countries has consistently achieved its goal. On 
the contrary, most of the annual results have 
demonstrated failure, in that they have fallen 
outside the proposed target range, or outside a 
range of (for example) four percentage points 
around a specific target; short-term results have 
been even less satisfactory. Furthermore, in most 
cases, the application of a monetarist rule has 
0 8One of the main functions of a central bank is to 
liquidate accounts among commercial banks and other finan-
cial institutions. However, the monetary authority cannot 
control all the factors, such as transportation, computer sys-
tems and the actual volume of transactions, which determine 
how the terms for payment and collection of checks and other 
documents vary. In practice, this account tends to be quite 
volatile. 
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been followed by a greater variability of monet-
ary growth.69. 
69We obtained 53 annual observations for six industrial 
countries (United States, 1976-1982; Canada, 1976-1982; 
United Kingdom, 1976-1982 ; Federal Republic of Germany, 
1975-1982; France, 1976-1982 and Switzerland, 1975-1978 
and 1980-1982) which attempted to target the growth of the 
supply of one measure of money or another. When a toler-
ance (range) of 4% was allowed for those countries (Federal 
Republic of Germany, 1975-1978; France, 1976-1980 and 
Switzerland throughout the entire period) that have em-
ployed specific targets, the rate of failure was 57%; when a 
tolerance of 3% was allowed for, the rate of failure was 62%, 
To formulate their monetary targets, the United States and 
the Federal Republic of Germany (since 1979) have used 
ranges of 3% and Canada and the United Kingdom, of 4%. 
For data on the United States during the period 1979-1982, 
see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
"Monetary Report to Congress", published biannually in 
March and August since 1980, in Federal Reserve Bulletin; the 
data for 1976-1979 were taken from Robert H. Rasche, Allen 
H. Meltzer, Peter D. Sternlight and Stephen H. Axilrod, "Is 
the Federal Reserve's monetary control policy misdirected?", 
a debate sponsored by the journal of Money, Credit and Bank-
ing, on 30 April 1981, Ohio State University, Columbus, and 
published in Vol. xiv, No. 1, February 1982, p. 129. The 
The fundamental difficulty lies in the fact 
that the determinants of the means of payment 
i  statistics for the other countries were taken from Karen H. 
Johnson, "Foreign experience with targets for monetary 
growth", Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 69, N° [0, October 
1983, pp. 746-753, except for the references to the actual 
growth of Ms in France, which were taken from International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. For further 
i comments on the question of the control of money in indus-
i trial countries, see M. Tratianni and M. Nabli, "Money stock 
i  control in the EEC countries", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 
Bond 115, Heft 3, 1979 and M.T. Summer, "The operation 
», of monetary targets", Karl Brunner and Allen H. Meltzer 
i (eds.), Monetary institutions and the policy process, Carnegie, 
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, a series of the 
) supplement to Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 13, 1980. On 
! the question of short-term monetary control, see Daniel L. 
i Thornton, "The FOMC in 1982: de-emphasizing M|", Feder-
ti al Reserve of St. Louis Review, Vol. 65, No. 6, June/July 1983; 
Byron Higgins, "Should the Federal Reserve fine-tune 
monetary growth?", Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City ECU-
'S nomic Review, January 1982; Peter D. Sternlight, "Monetary 
' policy and open market operations in 1981", 1982, and 
t  "Monetary policy and open market operations m 1982", 
 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 
i second quarter 1983. On the variability of the growth of 
Fable 5 
CONTROL OVER THE ADJUSTED CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEET: 
SOURCES AND USES OF THE MONETARY BASE 
Sources* Uses'' 




To the private sector 
Non-financial 
Financial 
To the public sector 
Receipts in process 
Others 
Factors of contraction 
External liabilities 
Domestic liabilities 
Deposits of government 
Deposits of the non-financial 
private sector 
Payments in process 















Cash outside banks N 
Commercial bank reserves N 
Legal reserves Dc 
Excess reserves N 
"Dc: The monetary authority is able to exercise discretionary control. 
Nc: The monetary authority is able to exercise non-discretionary control. 
N: The monetary authority is not able to exercise control. 
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which the monetary authority does not control 
may vary greatly and somewhat irregularly. The 
recent behaviour of the monetary multiplier in 
the same Latin American and Caribbean 
countries70 in which agreements with the Fund 
were in force towards the end of 1983 speak very 
er than that which is usually observed in the 
developed countries and would in itself make of 
monetary programming an enterprise highly 
difficult to realize with any degree of accuracy 
over time. 
Nevertheless, it is easier to programme the 
supply of money than to control the money stock, 
since the latter depends not only on the former 
money after the application of monetary rules, see R.W. 
Hafer and Scott E. Hein, "The wayward money supply: a post 
mortem of 1982", Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, Vol. 
65, No. 3. 
70Except Panama, whose monetary accounts are not 
directly comparable with those of the other countries. 
eloquently of the magnitude of the problem. In-
deed during the period 1978-1982, the average 
quarterly coefficient of variation in the 16 coun-
tries in question was 16.4% for the M, multiplier 
and 17.2% for the M2 multiplier (see table 6). 
This instability is, as a matter of fact, much high-
but also on the demand for real monetary bal-
ances. Of the factors —interest rates, income 
and expected inflation— which determine that 
demand, there is not one that the authority can 
effectively control except perhaps the interest 
rate. But if it decides to control the latter variable, 
it cannot exercise any control whatsoever over 
the supply of means of payment. 
To predict the demand for money with any 
degree of success would be just as or more diffi-
cult than predicting the future trend of the 
money multiplier. However, rather than explor-
ing that problem, we shall consider the effect that 
a mistake in forecasting the demand for means of 
payment would have on the variation of external 
assets of the monetary authority. For this analy-
Table 6 
MONEY MULTIPLIERS IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES', 1978-19821' 































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, several issues. 
aAll countries that had agreements with the International Monetary Fund in force at the end of 1983, except Panama, whose 
monetary accounts are not comparable with those of the other countries, 
bQuarterly figures. 
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sis, the same countries were used.71 The ratio 
between 1 % of M i and the variation and the stock 
of net external assets of the monetary authority 
during a recent year (1982) was calculated for 
each country. The same calculations were made 
using 1% of M 2 and 5% of Mi and 5% of M2. The 
results show how difficult it is to programme the 
means of payment and the overall performance 
of the balance of payments. Indeed, if the mone-
tary approach to the balance of payments were 
applied mechanically, a very minor error of 1% 
in forecasting the demand for money would have 
meant, on average, a 7% difference between the 
target and the actual balance-of-payments 
result.72 The same minor {i.e., 1 %) error in fore-
casting the demand for M«¿ —the monetary 
aggregate with which the Fund usually works in 
its adjustment programmes— would give rise to 
an average error in the balance-of-payments out-
come of almost 18%. 
If more realistic magnitudes of prediction 
error —such as 5%— were used the difference 
between targets and actual results for net exter-
nal assets would be very great. A 5% error in 
forecasting Mt would have meant on average a 
difference of 35.6% between the target and the 
actual balance-of-payments result (see table 7). 
The problem arises, in part, from the fact that 
the stock of means of payment is usually apprecia-
bly greater than the holding of net external 
assets (see table 7). 
Naturally, if the monetary authority realizes 
in time that the forecast for the demand for 
money does not reflect the real trend followed by 
that variable, it can —and normally should— 
change its (implicit) targets for net domestic 
assets of the banking system concomitantly. But 
this realization is at least as difficult a task as 
predicting accurately the demand for means of 
payment. Also, in some cases, a revision of im-
7
'Except Costa Rica, for which no data were available. 
7 2It should be remembered, however, that the Fund's 
targets for the stock of net external assets are expressed as 
minimum values. Therefore, although underestimation of 
the demand for money would result in a difference between 
the result and the target, this would not entail an infringe-
ment of the target that would only occur in the case of an 
overestimation. 
plicit targets might jeopardize achievement of 
explicit targets. 
We thus arrive at the dead-end street in 
which the countries participating in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund's adjustment programmes 
find themselves. If the monetary authority's con-
trol over monetary aggregates is very imperfect, 
the achievement of specific targets such as those 
used by the Fund implies the implementation of 
a more restrictive —and perhaps much more 
restrictive— policy than indicated by the targets 
themselves. Here is another recessionary bias of 
the Fund's adjustment programmes. On the 
other hand, an attempt to avoid an unnecessarily 
restrictive policy —that is, an attempt to get as 
close as possible to the targets without overshoot-
ing them— implies running a high risk of in-
fringing the performance criteria and thus for-
feiting access to Fund financing. But the dilem-
ma is even more sinister. Indeed, when a country 
fails to meet a performance criterion, not only 
does it lose the right to draw on the Fund financ-
ing originally envisaged, but it also is deprived of 
its access to the international financial market or 
finds it radically reduced. Here then is another 
recessionary bias. 
It is not surprising that, finding themselves 
caught "between a rock and a hard place", the 
governments and the people are reluctant to sign 
adjustment agreements with the International 
Monetary Fund. Nor is it surprising, in light of 
these considerations, that those countries which 
do adopt the adjustment programmes so often 
fail to meet the performance criteria and that 
their economic performance tends to be so 
mediocre. 
ii) Alternative reform proposals 
Notwithstanding the argument developed 
above, there is a sense in which the authority can 
exercise relatively strict control over the means of 
payment. Indeed, by extending the time horizon 
of control, the difference between the average 
outcome and an average target in relation to the 
standard deviation of the outcome from a specif-
ic target decreases progressively for the simple 
reason that the differences between outcomes 
and targets tend to offset each other. If targets 
are expressed as averages of specific (daily) out-
comes, the authority can, in fact, exercise over 
the long haul fairly close "control" over monetary 
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Table 7 
PERCENTAGES OF M, AND Ma IN RELATION TO NET EXTERNAL ASSETS OF THE MONETARY 
AUTHORITY IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1982'' 
1% of: 5% of: 
M2 in relation to net 
external assets 
M, in relation to net 
external assets 
Mg in relation to net 
external assets 
Mj in relation to net 
external assets 
Variation Stock at end Variation Stock at end Variation Stock at end Variation Stock at end 
between end of 1982 between end of 1982 between end of 1982 between end of 1982 
of 1981 and of 1981 and of 1981 and of 1981 and 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, several issues. 
aAll countries that had agreements with the International Monetary Fund in force at the end of 1983, except Panama (whose 
monetary accounts are not comparable with those of the other countries) and Costa Rica (for which 1982 monetary data have not 
been published in International Financial Statistics). 
aggregates. In contrast, in the case of specific 
targets, the standard deviation of the outcomes is 
independent of the period in which control is 
attempted. With this type of target, the author-
ity's ability to control the means of payment is 
not, in principle, greater in one year than in one 
quarter. 
In short, the problem with specific targets is 
not a question of time periods. On the other 
hand, the usefulness of targets that are made up 
exclusively of averages is not clear.73 It would 
seem, therefore, that as far as the degree of speci-
ficity is concerned, instead of specific targets such 
as those used by the Fund or simple averages, it 
would be more appropriate to use quasi-specific 
(or quasi-average) targets, specific ranges or 
quasi-specific ranges. 
*See, Bryant, op. cit., 1982. 
Quasi-specific (or quasi-average) targets are 
expressed as the variation between two time 
periods of an average value; for example, the 
variation between the average value recorded in 
December and that recorded in June. Specific 
ranges are expressed as an interval around a 
specific target; for example, if the target is a 7% 
variation between 31 March and 31 December, 
the actual result would have to be in a range of, 
say, 5% to 9%. Quasi-specific ranges are a com-
bination of the two solutions just mentioned. 
They are, of course, the least specific of the three 
and are therefore the most likely to be met consis-
tently. For the same reason, they could be 
achieved with a less restrictive policy than would 
be required for either of the other two alterna-
tives. However, there is still another source of 
recessionary bias, i.e., the rigidity of the targets. 
Indeed, targets may also be either fixed, as are 
the Fund's, or contingent. 
If the values of the factors detemining the 
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monetary aggregates —monetary multipliers, 
demand for money and external conditions— 
turn out to be different than what had been fore-
cast, the original monetary targets could become 
unattainable or unnecessarily restrictive. For ex-
ample, suppose that the demand for money were 
underestimated. Under such circumstances, a 
loosening of restrictions on domestic credit could 
make it possible to achieve a higher level of activ-
ity without jeopardizing achievement of the bal-
ance-of-payments target. However, doing so 
would make it impossible to meet the target for 
the stock of net domestic assets of the monetary 
authority. 
The solution we favour, then, is that of con-
tingent quasi-specific ranges, because, if proper-
ly designed, it would (virtually) eliminate all the 
recessive bias associated with conditionality.7,1 
This solution would not entail, however, a policy 
less restrictive than the one implied by specific 
Five sources of recessionary bias in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund's adjustment programmes 
have been identified: the insufficiency of the 
amount of financing, the inconsistency of domes-
tic economic policies, the use of the stock of net 
external assets as a performance criterion, the 
use of fixed specific targets for the performance 
criteria, and the nature of the link between exter-
nal financing and adjustment agreements. 
With regard to the first aspect, it was argued 
that the flow of external financing has not 
reached a magnitude compatible with efficient 
adjustment; in other words, it has not been suffi-
cient to finance that part of the current-account 
74Obviously, this reform would not affect the link be-
tween conditionality and financing from the international 
financial community. However, by making it possible to meet 
conditionality without having to follow unduly restrictive 
policies, it would, presumably, prevent that recessionary bias 
from operating. 
targets if the authority were really able to exer-
cise close control over monetary aggregates. Nor 
would it entail a policy less restrictive than the 
one implied by fixed targets if all forecasts con-
cerning the factors which determine monetary 
aggregates turned out to be accurate. 
Thus, the reform proposed would make it 
feasible to comply with conditionality without ap-
plying policies that were more restrictive than 
indicated by the targets themselves. Moreover, 
purging the recessionary bias from conditionality 
would also eliminate one of the main obstacles to 
more timely adjustment programmes. So, why 
not do it? 
We do not understand why the Fund con-
tinues to use fixed specific targets, particularly 
when its own staff members have recognized that 
it is impossible to exercise close control over 
monetary aggregates and have recommended 
that targets should be made more flexible.75 
deficit that is attributable to temporary external 
factors. This inadequacy refers not only to 
financing provided by the Fund but also to 
financing from other sources. In this regard, it 
was held that the Fund has not satisfactorily per-
formed the role of catalyst that it has taken upon 
itself. 
It was argued that this first —and fun-
damental— problem reflects the fact that the 
procedure used for establishing the countries' 
quotas in the Fund is not adequately linked with 
efficiency criteria. During the period under con-
sideration, however, the inadequacy of external 
financing also reflected the slowness of the 
75See Mohsin S. Khan and Malcolm D. Knight, "Stabi-
lization p rog rams in developing countr ies : a formal 
framework", IMP Staff Papers, Vol. 28, No. 1, March 1981. In 
this respect, the aforementioned Fund experts state (pages 
42-43): "... even a modest extension of the financial program-
ming framework yields a model in which the relationship 
III 
Summary and conclusions 
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Fund's response to the economic crisis. This in-
congruency was attributed both to defects in the 
Fund's adjustment programmes which make 
governments and the people reluctant to resort 
to it, and to the toughening of conditionality 
precisely when the economic crisis was in the 
making. However, the Fund denies having 
toughened its conditionality. 
The other four sources of recessionary bias 
spring from the domestic adjustment policies. In 
the first place, on the basis of the diversity of 
conditions prevailing in the different countries 
involved, we questioned the rationale underlying 
the uniformity, both in performance criteria and 
in operational monetary targets, observed in the 
17 agreements examined. 
In the second place, in each agreement we 
noted a certain asymmetry in the mix of policy 
understandings. Indeed, while in real terms 
wages and salaries and public-sector expendi-
tures were restricted and other key variables, 
such as the exchange rate and the prices of public 
services, were increased, no provision at all was 
specifically made regarding the price level of 
goods and non-factor services in the private sec-
tor. It was argued that this asymmetry would 
seem to work against the basic condition that 
must prevail in order for monetary deflation to 
lead to deceleration of inflation and a strength-
ening of external accounts rather than to a 
decrease in the level of activity, since it would 
encourage —or at least it would not discourage— 
between the targeted reserve increase (net international re-
serves or net external assets) and domestic credit (net domes-
tic assets) is complicated and depends on the structure of the 
economy. Conversely, measures to hold domestic credit at 
some prearranged level will not result in a smooth path of 
accumulation of international reserves, a conclusion that 
holds in this model even though it neglects such complica-
tions as the effect of changing expectations on international 
capital flows. The practical implication is that policymakers 
cannot 'fine tune' domestic credit ceilings from quarter to 
quarter or even year to year without having much more 
comprehensive information about the structure of the econ-
omy than they can reasonably be expected to possess. One 
possible way out of this difficulty might be to devise some 
simple feedback rule in which the domestic credit ceilings are 
altered in response to current and past deviations between 
targeted and actual reserves". (Parentheses were added by 
the author of this article.) 
the formation of inflationary expectations and 
price rises that would exceed the targets estab-
lished for the means of payment. 
On the other hand, we did not note any ex-
cessive aggregation or find a systematic reces-
sionary bias in the magnitude and direction of 
the targets. Contrary to all expectations, howev-
er, in most of the agreements examined, restric-
tions on the availability of bank credit appear to 
be more stringent for the private sector than for 
the public sector. 
T h e third source of recessionary bias is 
found in the practice of using the monetary au-
thority's holdings of net external assets as a per-
formance criterion. The problem arises from the 
fact that the authority does not exercise any con-
trol over several of the main determinants of the 
balance-of-payments outcome nor can it in prac-
tice compensate instantly and fully for unex-
pected developments. Nonetheless, it is required 
to do so, under penalty of losing the Fund's 
financial support. 
With regard to the appropriateness of the 
performance criteria, we also drew attention to 
the anomaly involved in the Fund's practice of 
restricting the external indebtedness of the pub-
lic sector but not that of the private sector. 
Whether this policy is based on a laissez-faire 
approach or on some other, the fact is that it 
clearly clashes with the marked reluctance of the 
international banking community to lend money 
to the private sector of the Third World in times 
of economic crisis. 
The other sources of recessionary bias have 
to do with the use of fixed specific targets for the 
performance criteria. Again, the problem lies in 
the fact that the authority is held responsible for 
results which it cannot achieve with precision nor 
at its discretion. Moreover, it is asked to perform 
this feat repeatedly —every quarter of the dura-
tion of the agreement— even if the values of the 
determinants of the monetary aggregates turn 
out to be different from what had been forecast. 
Consequently, the authority is faced with the 
dilemma of having to follow a more restrictive 
policy than is indicated by the targets themselves 
or running the risk of infringing the targets and 
losing not only the financial support of the Fund 
but that of practically the entire international 
financial community. 
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In summary, an agreement with the Fund 
does not mean that a country will obtain enough 
financing to implement an efficient adjustment. 
However, if it fails to meet one of the targets 
provided for in the agreement —perhaps for 
reasons that are entirely beyond the authority's 
control— its access to the international financial 
market could virtually be closed. 
The policy reforms we propose arise directly 
from our critique of the Fund's approach. The 
first and most fundamental one is that the Fund's 
financial capacity should be increased in order to 
enable it to promote efficient adjustment proces-
ses. But this proposal is unrealistic. However, a 
significant step could be taken without asking for 
more resources. Indeed, if the recessionary bias 
of the Fund's domestic adjustment policies were 
eliminated, one of the major causes of delay in 
responding to external disequilibria with adjust-
ment programmes would also be eradicated. 
Moreover, if the Fund were to provide more of 
its financing at the beginning of the adjustment 
agreement (i.e., if it were to "front-load" the 
agreements), it might be able to better perform 
its role as a catalyst of financing from the interna-
tional financial community. 
With respect to the reform of domestic 
adjustment policies, in the first place, perfor-
mance criteria (and operational targets) can and 
usually should, without prejudice to the principle 
of equal treatment governing the Fund's opera-
tions, be adapted to the circumstances of each 
country whenever these circumstances might 
affect the outcome of the programme. 
With regard to the mix of policy understand-
ings, the most important initiative would be to 
add an overall incomes policy, with a view to 
harmonizing inflationary expectations with the 
restrictions placed on the remunerations of the 
labour force and on the growth of money, in 
order to deflect the shocks produced by mone-
tary deflation towards prices and the balance of 
payments and away from the level of activity. 
With regard to the variables and targets used 
for performance criteria, we advocate eliminat-
ing the use of the stock of net external assets as a 
performance criterion and replacing fixed specif-
ic targets by quasi-specific contingent ranges. 
These last two reforms are perhaps the most 
attractive ones, because there is a growing con-
sensus regarding the concepts and evidence on 
which they are based, they do not entail any cost 
and they would (virtually) eliminate the reces-
sionary bias associated with conditionality. In-
deed, they would make it feasible to comply with 
conditionality without applying policies that 
were more restrictive than necessary and, conse-
quently, would also reduce the possibility of a 
country's losing access to the international finan-
cial market. 
